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FINANCIAL MARKETS UNCERTAINTY AND
THE RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT FOR CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTY CLEARING OF OTC DERIVATIVES
STEVEN MCNAMARA*
One of the key measures in the Dodd-Frank Act intended to curb systemic
risk in the financial system is the central counterparty (CCP) clearing mandate
for over-the-counter derivatives.  The mandate reflects the belief of legislators and
many financial markets experts that these derivatives, particularly credit default
swaps, were an important cause of the financial crisis of 2008.  While deriva-
tives markets do create extensive interconnections between financial institutions,
and were essential to the creation of the structured finance securities that fueled
the housing bubble, in hindsight it appears that derivatives were not a proximate
cause but rather one of many “but for” structural causes of the crisis.  As a result,
the CCP clearing mandate has been extensively criticized on the grounds that it
carries with it significant risks for the global financial system, while providing
little benefit in return.
This Article offers a critical examination of the arguments against CCP
clearing and a defense of the mandate and other Dodd-Frank Title VII deriva-
tives provisions.  Beginning with the fundamental uncertainty about the true
causes of the crisis that remains, it then examines the arguments against CCP
clearing, finding that they rely on overly narrow boundaries in order to achieve a
measure of precision in making a cost-benefit analysis, thereby ignoring many of
the important costs that derivatives indirectly contributed to.  Given that a more
complete cost-benefit analysis appears to run aground on the complexity of accu-
rately enumerating all the costs and benefits associated with modern financial
markets, this Article instead proposes looking at the problem of derivatives regula-
tion through a Rawlsian framework.  Central to Rawls’s thought is the procedure
of decision-making under conditions of fundamental uncertainty, or the max-
imin rule.  I argue that application of the maximin rule is appropriate here, and
that unlike the standard cost-benefit analysis grounded in utilitarianism,
Rawls’s views lead to a holistic understanding of the financial markets in their
larger societal context that both guides and justifies legislative action in the con-
text of fundamental uncertainty by prioritizing the safety of the financial system.
Such a holistic understanding of economic regulation is necessary as govern-
ments struggle to preserve social stability in the face of widespread economic chal-
lenges such as unemployment, income inequality, excessive debt, and instability
in the financial system.
* Assistant Professor, Business Law, Olayan School of Business, the American Uni-
versity of Beirut; B.A., St. John’s College; Ph.D., Boston College; J.D., Columbia University
School of Law.  The author may be contacted at sm99@aub.edu.lb.  He wishes to thank
participants at the 2012 meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association; his
AUB colleagues, Ali Termos and Ibrahim Jamali; and Dan Awrey, Michael Brennan,
David Driesen, and Julian Velasco for helpful comments and discussion during the course
of preparation of this Article.  All errors are his own.
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INTRODUCTION
The efforts to reform the trading regime for over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives1 have given rise to some of the most heated contro-
versies surrounding the financial reform process in the wake of the
credit crisis of 2008.  At stake for the major investment banks is a sub-
stantial percentage of their yearly revenues.  For government regula-
tors, an unregulated trading regime in a $650 trillion global market
calls into question their ability to police the shadow-banking system
and, more broadly, to safeguard the global financial system as a whole.
For the academics who study the financial system, derivatives regu-
lation highlights certain crucial epistemological questions: What are the
limits of the evidence that can be drawn on to obtain an accurate
understanding of the financial system?  How should we view proposi-
tions that we highly suspect may be true but cannot confidently prove?
And how should we deal with uncertainty, both in the attempt to accu-
rately understand the financial system, and in the possible effects of the
regulations we impose on it?  The epistemological quickly leads to the
moral, as how one answers these questions affects the degree to which
one allows broader moral concerns to influence both our understand-
ing and regulation of financial markets.  The thesis of this Article is that
given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the operation of
highly complex, contemporary financial markets, and the broad, and
for many very deep, effects of a financial crisis, a Rawlsian perspective
1. A note on terminology: in this Article, “derivative” is used in its narrower sense to
denote financial instruments such as options and swaps, excluding structured finance
securities such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBSs), and other forms of asset-backed securities (ABSs).
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better frames our understanding of the financial markets than one
grounded in utilitarianism.  It also offers strong support for the reforms
that were enacted in 2010 in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).2
The cornerstone of the derivatives reform in Title VII is the central
counterparty (CCP) clearing mandate, which requires all derivatives to
be cleared through a clearing agency registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), as applicable.3  The debate over the mandate and
how to control the systemic risk emanating from OTC derivatives trad-
ing has been joined by both legal and finance scholars, and reflects the
deep fault lines in the general debate over how to best regulate the
activity of private actors in a system as complex as that of contemporary
finance.  The purpose of this Article is to explore these fault lines and
offer a defense of the pro-regulation position on both practical and
philosophical levels.  In this way it is meant as a complement to the
arguments of scholars, including Anupam Chander and Randall Costa,4
Michael Greenberger,5 Viral Acharya,6 Brian Quinn,7 David Skeel,8 and
perhaps less directly, Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl,9 and Lynn Stout.10
Derivatives, primarily (but not exclusively) in the form of credit
default swaps (CDSs), were one of the many “but for” causes of the
financial crisis.  They greatly increased the level of interconnection
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3. Although commonly referred to as the clearing “mandate,” the requirement is
more complicated than a simple blanket rule. See infra Part II.A.
4. See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study
in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639 (2010).
5. See Michael Greenberger, Out of the Black Hole: Regulatory Reform of the Over-the
Counter Derivatives Marker, in ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE, MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 99 (Rob-
ert Johnson & Erica Payne eds., 2010); see also The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis,
Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm’n Hearing (2010) (statement of Michael Greenberger), availa-
ble at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0630-Green-
berger.pdf.
6. See Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY:
HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 251 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009);
see also Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality: Centralized versus Over-
The-Counter Markets (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1573355.
7. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008,
5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 609 (2009).
8. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 14 (2010) (“The new framework for
clearing derivatives and trading them on exchanges is an unequivocal advance.”); see also
Kent Cherny & Ben R. Craig, Reforming the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: What’s To Be
Gained?, 6 FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, ECON. COMMENT. (2010), http://www.clevelandfed.
org/research/commentary/2010/2010-6.pdf.
9. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the
Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307
(2013).
10. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999).
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between financial markets institutions and were a necessary ingredient
in the construction of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  They
also made a substantial contribution to the opacity of the shadow bank-
ing system.  It is important to note, however, that derivatives were not
the proximate cause of the crisis; nor did the derivatives markets seize
up or otherwise fail during the crisis.  Moreover, the derivatives closest
to the scene of the disaster, CDSs on structured finance securities such
as those issued by the American Insurance Group (AIG), are highly cus-
tomized or “bespoke” contracts that would not be suitable for clearing
under the mandate and so would presumably not be directly affected by
the central pillar of Dodd-Frank Title VII.  Regulators and financial
markets experts therefore face a paradox: the types of derivatives most
closely associated with the recent crisis will not be subject to the main
regulatory solution, while the broader effects of other types of OTC
derivatives—most importantly, the degree to which they knit together
the major financial institutions in a highly complex and tightly coupled
system11—are, even now, uncertain.
This condition of uncertainty is reflected in many ways in the deriv-
atives debate.  Looking back at possible explanations for the crisis, com-
mentators emphasize how little is really known about the degree to
which derivatives were a contributing cause of the crisis, even though
many agree they were a key “but for” cause.12  And the dangers of deriv-
atives themselves often stem from the opacity of the bilateral markets
they trade in, and the inability of many parties to obtain a clear view of
their credit risk in derivatives transactions.  The unique properties of
CDSs enable parties to change their risk profile without the knowledge
of others.  On a system-wide basis, OTC derivatives create extensive
interlocking connections between financial market participants, gener-
ating conditions of tight coupling between institutions and making the
financial markets brittle and highly reactive to any hint of insolvency of
a major institution such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, or AIG.
Looking forward, regulators face the challenge of implementing
changes to highly complex markets, which they may not fully under-
stand and the effects of which are difficult or impossible to predict.
Although not the sole cause of the controversy surrounding deriva-
tives reform, this uncertainty has led to significant controversy sur-
rounding the new derivatives mandates and the manner and extent to
which the SEC and CFTC will implement and enforce them.  While the
mandates have considerable support, significant voices urge caution or
even abandonment of the CCP clearing mechanism as prone to ineffi-
11. Richard Bookstaber emphasizes the dangers that arise from tightly coupled,
highly complex systems in his analysis of recent derivatives disasters on Wall Street. See
RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN 143–64 (2007).
12. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70–74, 160–61 (2013); ALAN S. BLINDER,
AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD
279–82 (2013) (with respect to derivatives transactions, “when things started going off
track, rampant fears of counterparty default played major roles in shutting down mar-
kets.”). See also infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
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ciency and likely to create additional, significant centers of risk in the
financial system.13  This Article examines these arguments in light of
what we do and don’t know about the role of derivatives in the financial
crisis, with a view towards answering the following questions:
1. Given the conditions of pervasive and even fundamental
uncertainty, should we embrace the clearing and other new
mandates in Dodd-Frank?
2. If so, what argument best justifies them in the public policy
arena?
I contend that the arguments against the clearing mandate, while
highlighting possible danger zones that regulators will have to monitor,
ultimately fail to persuade.  They fail to take into account wider contex-
tual features of the derivatives trading system that are strongly sus-
pected of being key factors in the financial crisis.  They also downplay
the likelihood and severity of the effects of market failure in unregu-
lated derivatives markets, and implicitly assume that if an improvement
to a market were beneficial, private actors would have brought it about
already.14  And last but not least, critics of the clearing mandate appear
to employ a fairly narrow, albeit standard, conception of social welfare,
which carries with it the implicit assumption that a more efficient finan-
cial system is in the interest of society as a whole.15  Ultimately, they are
unable to respond to the wider economic, political, and moral concerns
raised by the financial crisis that relate back to the derivatives trading
regime, even if only indirectly.  In light of the effects of the financial
crisis and the likely central role that OTC derivatives trading played in
it, as a deep though admittedly indirect and shadowy cause, the criti-
cisms of the mandate fail to respond to a large measure of the real
impetus of the efforts to reform the derivatives markets.  The safety and
justice (as serving the larger cause of societal fairness) of the financial
system are, I contend, legitimate regulatory goals that the arguments
against the mandate fail to give their full due.
A powerful set of ideas does support the clearing mandate and
other Dodd-Frank derivatives provisions, however: the political thought
of John Rawls.  A holistic look at the financial system leads to the con-
clusion that our knowledge of the precise functioning of this system is
fundamentally colored by uncertainty.  Uncertainty also has a crucial
role in Rawls’s thought, as the “maximin” rule for choosing the rules of
a social system is one that applies in conditions of fundamental uncer-
tainty.  A Rawlsian argument for the Dodd-Frank derivatives legislation
contends that the irruption of systemic risk that occurred in the 2008
crisis and the accompanying recession were so injurious to the Ameri-
can and global economies that considerations of justice require imple-
mentation of legislation that is likely to mitigate systemic risk, even at
the expense of possible costs to the financial system, i.e., inefficiency
13. Most prominent among these are Craig Pirrong & Mark Roe; see infra Part
III.B.1.
14. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 246–53 and accompanying text.
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 113 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 113 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 7  1-MAY-14 15:13
2014] FINANCIAL MARKETS UNCERTAINTY AND THE RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT 215
generated by such regulation, and to the economy at large.  Further-
more, even if there is uncertainty as to the ultimate consequences of
creating a new regulatory structure, such uncertainty should not pre-
vent us from acting to control systemic risk.  Instead, uncertainty should
motivate vigilant oversight on the part of regulators.
In order to make this argument, I proceed in four parts: Part I
examines the role of derivatives in the financial crisis, highlighting their
unique characteristics in the world of financial instruments.  These
characteristics are a double-edged sword, making them highly useful for
a broad swath of companies, but also increasing the severity of their
risks and the unpredictability of their effects.  Part II presents an over-
view of Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the “Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010,” focusing on the clearing mandate and the
information reporting requirements in the derivatives markets.  Part III
turns to the arguments for and against the clearing mandate, and the
philosophical characteristics of these arguments.  Part IV argues that
given the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the role of derivatives
in the financial crisis, and the narrow scope of the arguments against
Dodd-Frank, it is better to err on the side of regulation that will likely
prevent a future outbreak of systemic risk, despite the possibility of effi-
ciency costs to financial markets participants and the economy.
Although the core proposition that the Dodd-Frank reforms will reduce
systemic risk cannot be known with certainty and is dependent on the
future actions of regulators and market participants, it is buttressed by
important political considerations drawn from Rawls’s Theory of Justice.
I. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: THEIR SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE
IN THE BANKING CRISIS OF 2008
A. A Brief Overview of Derivatives and Their Trading
1. Derivatives
What are derivatives, and what special characteristics differentiate
them from other investment contracts such as stocks and bonds that are
more familiar to the general public?  Derivatives are investment con-
tracts whose value is derived from the performance of another financial
instrument or instruments, or the occurrence of a specified event,
though not always in the financial markets.  Various categories of deriv-
atives include futures, swaps, forward contracts (or “forwards”), and
options, and they can be combined in various ways to produce hybrid
contracts such as “swaptions,” contracts giving the buyer the right to
buy or sell CDS protection.16  Derivatives trade on exchanges and over-
the-counter in bilateral markets; some also clear through central clear-
inghouses, while others are processed bilaterally by the two parties to
the contract themselves.
Because the value, or payoff, of a derivative depends on the per-
formance or occurrence of another security, entity, index, interest rate,
16. See generally David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, 92 ECON. REV. 1
(2007).
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or other variable, derivatives exist at a level of abstraction from tradi-
tional financial reality.17  This removal or separation presents many
opportunities for information failures and asymmetries.  The fact that
they depend on the performance of at least three variables—the two
parties to the contract, in addition to the underlying “reference obliga-
tion”—adds another element of complexity, as any party to the transac-
tion is dependent on both the performance of the reference obligation
and the creditworthiness of its counterparty.  And the performance of
parties to a derivatives transaction commonly includes a much longer
time horizon than a securities transaction, as a party to a derivatives
contract is exposed to the creditworthiness of its counterparty for the
entire life of the contract, as opposed to the very short time horizon of
the typical securities transaction, which usually occurs in a matter of
days.18  All of these factors produce a much more complex and poten-
tially risky landscape than is typically found with other financial con-
tracts or investments.
While trading in derivatives has exploded in the past decade, mov-
ing from total “notional” amounts outstanding of $63 trillion at the end
of 2000 to $466 trillion as of June 2010,19 they have an ancient lineage
in the agriculture markets stretching back millennia.  Derivatives trans-
actions trace back to 2000 B.C. in the Middle East,20 were common in
medieval Europe, and more recently flourished in Chicago in the 1800s
in connection with American agriculture.21
In their simplest form, derivatives consist of contracts for the
future purchase or sale of agricultural commodities.  In three months’
time, for example, Farmer Smith agrees to sell 100 bushels of wheat to
Trader Jones.  Such a contract is called a future, as the terms of a trans-
action in the future are settled today.  It is easy to see how a future
could be used as a form of insurance, or as a hedge: if Farmer Smith is
concerned about the price of his crops falling, he can protect himself
by locking in a price today.  Of course, this simple hedge also exposes
him to the risk that he will forego any rise in the price that may occur.
17. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 1010–14 (1995) (“The Emergence of
Derivative Reality”); see also SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS & MONEY: KNOWNS AND
UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 55 (2010) (“To enter the world of
derivatives trading is to enter a realm of beautiful lies.”).
18. See Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A
comparison of central counterparties and alternative structures, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 22 (2006);
Randall Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?: The Development of Deriv-
atives Clearinghouses and Recent over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
596, 600 (1999).
19. Market Surveys, INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION (June 30,
2010), http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/market-surveys.  Figures
from the Bank of International Settlements are higher, showing $648 trillion outstanding
at year-end 2011. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY AND ECONOMIC
DEPARTMENT, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2011
(2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1205.pdf.
20. See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of
Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).
21. See Kroszner, supra note 18, at 598.
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 114 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 114 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-MAY-14 15:13
2014] FINANCIAL MARKETS UNCERTAINTY AND THE RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT 217
On the other side of the transaction, Mr. Jones is willing to commit to a
specified price today because he believes the price agreed to in the
futures contract affords him a worthwhile opportunity for gain.  Either
he believes the price may rise substantially from its current level, or the
price he offers for purchase three months hence contains enough of a
discount from the current cost to function as a sort of insurance pre-
mium for the risk of a decline.
While futures in the agricultural sector still have substantial eco-
nomic importance, as well as futures on other commodities used in the
industrial, energy, and minerals sectors, the most important recent
growth in the derivatives markets has been the development of swaps:
particularly, interest rate, currency, and credit default swaps.22  A
“swap” accomplishes what its name implies—a trade, in the case of a
CDS, of the credit risk associated with a particular debt security or other
financial obligation specified in the contract.  Similar to a future, it
functions as a kind of insurance.  But in the case of a swap, the need to
purchase or sell the underlying asset is done away with, although liabil-
ity for the entire worth of the reference asset remains.23  In fact,
because the risk alone associated with the performance of an asset can
be separated out from the asset itself, and the risk alone traded, a swap
is in some ways equivalent to an insurance policy: the risk associated
with an asset is transferred to another party in return for a fee just as a
purchaser of homeowner’s insurance, for example, pays a regular fee
for an insurance policy covering the worth of her house in the event of
its destruction.24
While there are a number of important varieties, such as total
return swaps, interest rate swaps, and currency swaps, the focus of this
Article is the CDS.  A typical CDS transaction would be the following: A
party holding $10 million of General Motors bonds would like to insure
those bonds against the risk of default.  To do so, it enters into a CDS
with a major investment bank where it pays a yearly fee of 200 basis
points, or 2% of the total value of the reference obligation divided up
into quarterly payments of $50,000 each.  As long as the purchaser of
the credit default swap makes its quarterly payments, any failure on the
part of General Motors to make its scheduled interest or principal pay-
ments will be covered by the credit default swap seller.  In this example,
the value of the contract to the seller is $200,000, or the fee income it
will earn for selling the bond protection.  The “notional amount” of this
CDS, however, is $10 million.  While in ordinary circumstances it is
22. See Robert E. Litan, The Derivatives Dealers’ Club and Derivatives Markets Reform: A
Guide for Policy Makers, Citizens and Other Interested Parties, INITIATIVE ON BUS. AND PUB.
POL’Y AT BROOKINGS 1, 13–15 (2010); BLINDER, supra note 12, at 65–68.
23. See Margaret M. Blair & Erik F. Gerding, Sometimes Too Great a Notional: Measur-
ing the “Systemic Significance” of OTC Credit Derivatives, 1 LOMBARD STREET 10 (2009); Men-
gle, supra note 16, at 1–2 (“The protection buyer is entitled to protection on a specified
face value, referred to in this paper as the notional amount, of reference entity debt.”).
24. For a critical examination of the similarities and dissimilarities between credit
derivatives and insurance, see M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not ‘Insurance’ (U.
Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 476, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440945.
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wrong to say that the contract is “worth” $10 million, because the likeli-
hood of the General Motors bonds becoming worthless is exceedingly
small, notional value is still a measure of the total potential financial
risk.  The CDS seller is ultimately responsible for the total value of the
reference obligation, just as the insurer of a house would be responsible
for its complete replacement cost in the event of its total destruction.25
2. Special Risks Inherent in Derivatives Transactions
It is easy to see from this overview that derivatives are inherently
more complex than securities transactions; investment in a stock or
bond gives the purchaser a direct investment in the company, as either
an owner or creditor, whereas a derivatives transaction always involves
at least three central elements: (1) the purchaser, (2) the seller, and (3)
the underlying reference obligation.  In the case of a CDS transaction,
this reference obligation is often a corporate bond, with sovereign debt,
asset-backed securities, or indices of these instruments being other
common reference obligations.26  The addition of a third party to a
transaction greatly multiplies the potential for complexity and unpre-
dictability of performance and the difficulty of estimating the worth of
the contract.  Derivatives transactions differ in three basic ways from
securities transactions.  These differences likely made the crisis of 2008
unforeseeable to most market participants and economists; they also
greatly complicate the challenge of reducing the systemic risk engen-
dered by derivatives trading.
First, counterparty exposure exists with a derivatives transaction
throughout the life of the contract.  With a securities purchase,
counterparty exposure only lasts for a couple of days, at most, during
which the ownership of the particular securities is transferred from the
seller to the buyer.  This is now handled through the Depository Trust
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) system in an automated and regular
fashion.27  The investor, of course, remains exposed to the perform-
ance of the entity in which it invests, but this is a direct relationship that
is the entire purpose of the investment.  The transactional risk the par-
ties to a securities transaction bear is very brief.  A derivatives contract,
by contrast, is long-lived, and during this time the purchaser and the
seller are exposed to both the performance of the underlying reference
obligation and the risk that their counterparty will not perform.28  The
25. See Blair & Gerding, supra note 23, at 11:
[A]lthough the notional value is not a good indicator of the market value of a
derivative (because it is unlikely that each contract in the portfolio would have
to be settled for the full notional amount), the notional value of all the deriva-
tive contracts in an institution’s portfolio is a powerful indicator of the systemic
risk posed by that institution’s investments because it is the maximum amount
the institution could owe to (or be owed by) other financial institutions in an
extreme event such as the credit freeze . . . .
26. Litan, supra note 22, at 13.
27. See id. at 12.
28. See Bliss & Stiegerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement, supra note 18, at 23
(“With derivatives, however, the length of time between the execution of a transaction
and settlement is essential to the contract.”) (emphasis in original).
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seller of the contract could face the default of the buyer, in which case
the quarterly fee would not be forthcoming, and the buyer is exposed
to the risk that the seller would not be able to meet its obligation in the
face of disaster, as AIG’s counterparties faced in September 2008.  Since
counterparty risk is always present, it adds a great deal of risk and
uncertainty to derivatives transactions.  Furthermore, because informa-
tion concerning the counterparty’s true health is often unavailable, an
accurate measure of counterparty risk is very difficult for many parties
to achieve.29
A second key way in which derivatives transactions differ from
securities transactions is that many of them, in particular the complex
or “exotic” CDS transactions that occur in the OTC market, display
both volatile and non-linear values.30  Stock and bond prices, of course,
display a certain amount of volatility, with the fluctuation in their value
dependent on a wide variety of factors both endogenous and exoge-
nous to the issuing entity.  CDS prices, however, display much greater
volatility.  The market for a CDS on a corporate bond is typically much
more sensitive to information concerning the issuer of the reference
obligation than the price of the bond itself, resulting in much greater
volatility.31  Furthermore, the value of a complex derivative is often
non-linear, i.e., it does not vary in a one-to-one relationship with the
value of the underlying obligation.  As Pirrong explains, exotics often
display a “skewness” in price: when a company nears default, the value
of its bonds falls precipitously, but when a company strengthens its
financial position from a point of relative health, a corresponding price
increase is unlikely.32  Therefore, a CDS on a company nearing default
will jump wildly in price.33  As a result, “upward spikes in the cost of
protection (corresponding to downward spikes in the value of [the]
position held by the protection seller) are more common than down-
ward spikes.”34  In conjunction with the naturally greater amount of
volatility of CDS, such downward price spikes on the underlying bond
can lead to very non-linear risk exposures.  Pirrong also notes that CDSs
built on portfolios of underlying obligations will display greater sensitiv-
29. See Interconnectedness, Fragility and the Financial Crisis, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
(Feb. 26–27, 2010) (statement of Randall Kroszner), available at http://fcic-static.law.stan-
ford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0226-Kroszner.pdf; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra
note 12, at 74 (“Because most trades are made over the counter, out of the sight of other
market participants, it is all but impossible for anyone to have a precise picture of other
participants’ overall exposures and default risks.”).
30. See Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asym-
metric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 35 (U.
Hous. Working Paper 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1340660; Rene´ M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON.
PERSP. 73, 82 (2010).
31. Stulz notes that CDS on corporate bonds are much more sensitive to informa-
tion concerning the issuer than are the prices of the corporate bonds themselves.  Stulz,
supra note 30, at 75-76.
32. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 35.
33. See, e.g., infra Part I.B (discussing the sudden increase in CDS protection as Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers each ran into financial difficulty).
34. Pirrong, supra note 30, at 35.
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ity to correlation risk than the volatility of any one name within the
portfolio would, due to the much greater collective sensitivity to default
risk of the portfolio as a whole than any one name.35  The non-linearity
of CDS prices was an important factor in the credit crisis of 2008, partic-
ularly with respect to AIG.36
A third crucial difference between many derivatives transactions
and common securities transactions is the lack of publicly disseminated
price information.37  Securities listed on the public markets trade at
publicly available prices, observable by all market participants in real
time.  Furthermore, issuers of publicly traded securities are required to
comply with the often extensive disclosure regimes of the securities laws
of their jurisdiction.  OTC derivatives markets generally lack observable
prices, forcing parties to rely on quotes offered by the major dealers.  In
addition, many important OTC derivatives cover reference obligations
which do not disclose financial information, for example, CDS protec-
tion sold on CDOs backed by real estate assets.  The opacity of the
transaction therefore does not just cover counterparty risk then, as dis-
cussed above, but extends to the pricing of the particular CDS as well as
the true risk embodied in the underlying obligation.  Such a risk is of
course not limited to purchasers of CDS protection from major deriva-
tives dealers.  In the case of AIG, its sales of credit protection on funda-
mentally opaque and hard-to-value CDOs threatened to bring it down,
because it was not able (or managers in its Financial Products unit
lacked the proper incentives) to accurately price the risk embodied in
the underlying CDOs.38
The heightened riskiness and opacity of derivatives transactions
was an important contributing cause of the systemic risk that prompted
the bailouts of Fall 2008, as Part I.B below explores; this risk and opacity
also prompted the key provisions of Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the central
clearing mandate and the information provision requirements, which
are the subject of Part II.
3. Derivatives Trading
The manner in which CDSs or other derivatives are traded is just as
important for considerations of systemic risk as their intrinsic character-
istics.  Many standardized derivatives are traded on exchanges, and
derivatives other than those specifically exempt from the exchange
trading requirement of the Commodities Exchange Act must be con-
ducted on exchanges.39  For certain other classes of derivatives, such as
35. Id.
36. See infra Part I.B.3.
37. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Mar-
kets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 243 n.24 (2012) (contrasting public capital markets with
modern financial markets generating significant amounts of complexity).
38. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-
World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at A1.
39. For a discussion of the development of the exemptions from the Commodities
Exchange Act’s requirement that derivatives be traded on an exchange, see Stout, supra
note 10, at 18–22.
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index options, foreign currency options, and “plain vanilla” credit
default swaps on corporate bonds, the proper incentives have existed to
spur exchange trading, particularly in recent years.40  In addition,
almost all derivatives that are traded on exchanges are cleared through
central counterparty clearing mechanisms.41  Lastly, the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements estimates that, as of December 2011, OTC deriva-
tives totaled $647.5 trillion in notional amounts, while exchange-traded
derivatives amounted to $55.5 trillion.42  While Dodd-Frank focuses on
moving as much of the OTC market as possible into clearinghouses,
and exchanges too if one should list a particular derivative, all three
means of conducting derivatives transactions entail risks for counterpar-
ties, the creditors of counterparties, and the financial system and soci-
ety as a whole.  And while exchange trading remains a goal of
regulators because of the benefits of price transparency associated with
exchange listings, a derivative is only traded on an exchange when
required by law, as with agricultural futures and options under the
Commodity Exchange Act, or when economic factors incentivize an
exchange listing.  A derivative must be sufficiently standardized and
demand fairly deep for exchange trading to make sense independent of
regulatory fiat.  The Deutsche Bo¨rse reported in 2008 that over 1,700
various derivatives were listed on exchanges around the globe, whereas
the varieties of OTC-traded derivatives are virtually limitless, depending
only on the needs of the counterparties to the transaction and the
terms of the specific contracts written between them.43
In contrast to exchange trading, a much larger subset of derivatives
are centrally cleared through a clearinghouse.  The CCP clearing mech-
anism is the heart of the Dodd-Frank derivatives provisions, and
presents attractive benefits as well as risks, inefficiencies, and
unknowns.  A CCP differs from an exchange in that contracts cleared
through a CCP are not necessarily listed on an exchange, and so do not
require listing.44  In the stock markets, clearing is done through DTCC,
which handles the clearance and settlement of stock sales, bonds, and
government and asset-backed securities.  While the safety and sound-
ness of DTCC’s operations are crucial to the financial system, and the
failure of these back office functions in the 1970s caused extensive
harm and led to the creation of DTCC, clearing in the securities mar-
40. For a discussion of the development of derivatives exchanges and CCPs in by
private parties in response to market forces, see Kroszner, supra note 18, at 596. See also
DEUTSCHE BO¨RSE GROUP, THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION (2008),
available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/INTERNET/MR/mr_presse.nsf/0/0A4A6E3F8E
D836BDC1257457002D5669/$File/2008-04%20DB_WP%20GlobalDerivativesMarket_e.
pdf?OpenElement.
41. See Christopher L. Culp, The Treasury Department’s Proposed Regulation of OTC
Derivatives Clearing and Settlement 14 (CRSP, Working Paper No. 09-30, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430576.
42. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data are available at http://www.bis.
org/statistics/derstats.htm.
43. See DEUTSCHE BO¨RSE GROUP, supra note 40, at 10.
44. See Adam Glass, The Regulatory Drive Towards Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC
Credit Derivatives and The Necessary Limits on This, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. S79, S84 (2009).
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kets is fundamentally straightforward as most transactions close within a
matter of days.  Due to the much longer time horizon, and the more
complicated task of assessing the risk inherent in a particular derivative,
clearing in the derivatives markets is a more complicated task.45
When a derivative is centrally cleared, the clearinghouse steps in as
a party to both sides of the contract through the process of novation.
When A sells a credit default swap to B for example, the CCP it clears
through will enter into two offsetting contracts: A selling a credit
default swap to the CCP, and then CCP selling an equivalent credit
default swap to B.  In this way, the CCP inserts itself between the two
parties.  Because of its two offsetting contracts, as long as the parties
perform, the CCP bears no market risk since the two equivalent con-
tracts provide it with a perfect hedge.46  On the other hand, the CCP
does assume credit risk in the process of novation, as it is now exposed
to the risk of nonperformance of one or both of the counterparties A
and B.
The CCP uses three basic techniques to mitigate its credit risk:
restriction of transactions to clearing members (CMs), margin require-
ments, and a loss mutualization or “guarantee” fund that CMs must
contribute to.  Counterparties are required to post “margin” reflecting
the riskiness of the contract; margin is simply the collateral required as
insurance in case either party to the trade defaults, and acts as a shock
absorber for losses related to a position.47  Initial margin is required to
enter into the trade at the outset, and then as the value and risk of the
derivative change on a daily basis, variation margin levels are adjusted.
The CCP also maintains an additional means of protection from losses
in the form of a loss mutualization fund.48  All CMs are required to
contribute amounts to this common fund that can be drawn upon in
the event of unexpected losses.  The loss mutualization fund highlights
the self-insurance function of the CCP, as the CMs all contribute to this
fund for the privilege of having the CCP assume the credit risk of their
counterparties.  The CCP internalizes the risk that would otherwise
exist in the OTC market, where parties conduct bilateral trades, taking
away credit risk from the OTC markets while at the same time isolating
it into one entity.
These three aspects of the CCP mitigate credit risk for the CCP
itself, and in so doing, reduce the risk that market participants would
otherwise be exposed to in bilateral markets.  The CCP also reduces
overall systemic risk in a fourth and very important way by cancelling
45. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 23 (contrasting clearing and settlement
of derivatives transactions with those of securities transactions).
46. See Darrell Duffie et al., Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS 6 (2010); see also infra note 159 and accompany-
ing text.
47. See Hal Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 688 (2010); Duffie et al., supra note 46 (Appendix C: How
Clearing Participants Post Initial and Variation Margin).
48. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 25.
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out or “netting” overlapping amounts outstanding between parties.49
The netting function potentially plays a crucial role in the reduction of
overall systemic risk by lowering the total amount of obligations parties
have to one another in the financial system.  A CCP engages in multilat-
eral or “ring” netting by cancelling out duplicative positions on the
same contracts held by multiple parties.50  In the simplest example, if A
sells 500 of a particular CDS to B, B sells 500 of the same CDS to C, and
C sells 500 of that CDS to A, the parties have formed a “ring” with the
same contract whose net exposure is zero.  Because large financial insti-
tutions hold many offsetting positions on the same derivatives with
many different parties, multilateral netting of ring positions is often
possible.  A CCP identifies and cancels out these overlapping positions
with a net exposure of zero, resulting in total lower collateral required
of the parties, lower amounts of cross-trades to sort out in the event of
default of a CM, and total lower losses among the CMs.51  Because mul-
tilateral netting reduces the total outstanding exposures of derivatives
dealers, proponents of the CCP mandate argue that it reduces systemic
risk.
The move from bilateral clearing in the OTC markets to central
clearing also entails significant changes in the informational positions
of the parties to the transaction.  In a bilateral trade, both parties have
great incentives to assess the creditworthiness of their counterparty; in
particular, purchasers of CDS protection want to know that the seller,
which in the U.S. is usually one of the five major banks that deal in
OTC derivatives, will stand by its contract in the event of losses on the
underlying reference obligation.52  Since the dealer banks usually
hedge the risk of the transactions they enter into, by purchasing offset-
ting derivatives from other dealers, they convert their role as sellers of
insurance to dealers who profit from the spread or difference between
the prices of the two contracts.  Since the banks are very sophisticated,
well-connected entities with extensive, confidential books of derivatives
transactions, a bilateral derivatives transaction with a major investment
bank involves a substantial information asymmetry for the typical end-
user.53  First, since the bank has thousands of trades open, it has access
to extensive information on price and corporate creditworthiness that a
typical corporation or hedge fund purchasing CDS protection does not
49. See id. at 26.
50. See infra Part III.B.1.b.  Note that multilateral netting differs from the bilateral
netting that takes place in an OTC market.  In bilateral netting, two counterparties agree,
typically through their ISDA Master Agreement, to net out their total exposures, thereby
reducing collateral required for their trades.  Bilateral netting is not limited to their posi-
tions on the same derivative contract, but can apply to all outstanding contracts between
them.  The trade-offs between multilateral and bilateral netting form the core of Darrell
Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu’s analysis.  Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clear-
ing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74 (2011).
51. See infra Part III.B.1.c (discussing the possibility that multilateral netting may
not reduce total losses).  Pirrong and Roe emphasize that in a CCP regime employing
multilateral netting, losses are shifted from dealers’ non-CM creditors to its fellow CMs;
see infra note 208 and accompanying text.
52. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 35–36.
53. See Litan, supra note 22, at 17.
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have.  These informational advantages cover the creditworthiness of the
entity issuing the reference obligation, for example, the purchaser of
the CDS protection, as well as price information concerning recent
trades.  In addition to its inherent “balance sheet” advantage, the dealer
bank therefore derives substantial benefits from its informational
advantages in the OTC derivatives markets because it is believed to be
creditworthy, or, aside from Lehman Brothers, “Too Big to Fail” in the
event of market catastrophe.54
A CCP reduces these informational asymmetries and substantially
deprives the dealer banks of the ability to profit from them, though it
does not completely eliminate them, and may create other informa-
tional asymmetries in turn.  Crucially, a CCP lists price transaction data
on a daily basis, depriving dealers of a great deal of their informational
advantages vis-a`-vis uninformed derivatives counterparties coming to
the dealer banks asking for price quotes.55  While this does not elimi-
nate all the informational advantages of the large sophisticated institu-
tions offering derivatives, by moving recent price history into the open,
dealers are deprived of significant advantages.  (In addition, dealers
may consider the position information required for multilateral netting
on the part of the CCP to be sensitive, proprietary information.)56  And
by assuming credit risk, the CCP itself deprives the banks of their “bal-
ance sheet” advantage as large, creditworthy institutions.57
CCPs themselves give rise to other, unique informational asymme-
tries, however.  Because they do not bear market risk, and are not oth-
erwise dealing in the financial markets, CCPs will not incorporate the
wide base of information banks have at their fingertips into their deci-
sions intended to control credit risk; accordingly, they may set margin
that is too low or too high for the reference obligation that is the sub-
ject of the CDS, and they may not possess accurate information con-
cerning their CMs.  Because in practice CCPs price risk in a relatively
indiscriminate manner, Pirrong argues that the costs of asymmetric
information will be higher with CCPs than in the bilateral, dealer-domi-
nated market.58
B. The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis of 2008
What role then did derivatives play in the financial crisis, a role
which ostensibly inspired Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act?  While there
is a certain amount of data which can be used to shed light on this
question, and models have been developed which are relevant to ascer-
taining the role of derivatives in the crisis, at the deepest level much is
54. See id.; see also Robert R. Bliss & Chryssa Papathanassiou, Derivatives Clearing,
Central Counterparties and Novation: The Economic Implications 12 (2006), available at http://
www.jscc.co.jp/en/ccp12/materials/docs/3.pdf.
55. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677.
56. Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 26.
57. Id.
58. The lack of adequate incentives and ability on the part of CCPs to deal with
complex derivatives is the focus of Pirrong’s critique; see infra, Part III.B.1.a.
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unknown.59  Even with the relevant data, accurate assessment of the
risk stemming from the derivatives markets presents a very difficult
challenge.60  Furthermore, at the time of the crisis, financial institu-
tions and government officials were, practically speaking, operating in a
realm of uncertainty as to the true causes of the crisis and the ultimate
effects of their actions.61
It is also the case, as many commentators have observed, that deriv-
atives were not the proximate cause of the financial crisis, and that only
in the case of AIG were they directly implicated in the near failure of a
major financial institution.62  They were indirectly involved in the
financial crisis in a number of ways, though, the most important of
which was simultaneously the least well understood: their role in creat-
ing a highly interconnected financial system that fostered a climate of
extreme fear when a major derivatives counterparty, such as Bear
Stearns or Lehman Brothers, was suspected of harboring significant
losses due to large holdings of real estate-backed securities on its
books.63  This condition of fear, an essentially psychological factor,
likely caused the quick demise of both entities.64  It was pervasive and
resulted in the runs on Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers that caused
them to fail, but the connection to their derivatives activities is hard to
59. This is reminiscent of “Knightian uncertainty,” named after the economist
Frank Knight who distinguished between “risk” and “uncertainty”: the former is quantifi-
able, the latter not. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921).  Practi-
cally speaking, the systemic risk stemming from derivatives trading is not susceptible of
measurement because information on the interconnections between parties in the
shadow banking system is unavailable, even to regulators (though Title VII of Dodd-
Frank, discussed in Part II.B, will remedy this to some extent). See also Philippe Jorion,
Risk Management Lessons from the Credit Crisis, EUR. FIN. MGMT. 12 (2009) (contagion effects
of counterparty risk “transform traditional risks that can be measured into Knightian
‘uncertainty,’ a form of risk that is immeasurable.”); Stulz, supra note 30, at 90–91
(emphasizing the dearth of empirical knowledge concerning derivatives).
60. See Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 9–13 (2009).
61. See Ricardo J. Caballero, Sudden Financial Arrest, IMF ECON. REV., July 20, 2010,
at 9–11, available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6010 (arguing that financial institu-
tions were acting under conditions of Knightian uncertainty during the recent financial
crisis).
62. Commentators maintaining that derivatives trading was not a proximate cause
of the financial crisis include Houman B. Shadab, Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit
Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 412 (2009–2010) (“the financial crisis is
primarily the result of mispricing” of CDOs, not CDSs); Stulz, supra note 30, at 83 (“deriv-
atives were not a proximate cause of” the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers);
Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 55, 87 (2011); cf. Culp, supra note 41, at 2 (maintaining that there is “no real evidence
that a lack of clearing or exchange trading of standardized derivatives caused or contrib-
uted to the crash”); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1691
(2013) (arguing that system-wide asset price deterioration was to blame for the crisis, not
contagion through derivatives interconnections); Kimberly Summe, Misconceptions About
Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy and the Role Derivatives Played, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 16,
16–18 (2011).
63. See generally Kroszner, supra note 29; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12, at 68.
64. For an account of the role fear plays in financial crises, see Andrew W. Lo, Fear,
Greed, and Financial Crises: A Cognitive Neurosciences Perspective, in HANDBOOK ON SYSTEMIC
RISK 622 (Jean-Pierre Fouque & Joseph A. Langsam, eds., 2013).
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state exactly, let alone quantify.  This is the first and most important way
in which derivatives were indirectly responsible for the crisis.
Second, in their role in the structured finance industry, derivatives
contributed to the financial crisis by facilitating much greater exposure
to the U.S. real estate markets than would have otherwise been the case.
They were both used to create certain types of CDOs and as insurance
that allowed parties to offload the risk of real estate-backed CDOs and
other asset-backed securities.  By virtue of their role in creating CDOs at
the height of the boom, CDSs greatly increased the total amount of
exposure in the financial system to real estate.65  When the demand for
mortgages for use in the structured finance business began to outstrip
their supply, CDSs were used instead to create “synthetic” CDOs.  Syn-
thetic CDOs are collateralized debt obligations that use CDSs on asset-
backed securities (typically residential mortgage-backed securities or
“RMBSs”) in their asset pools instead of RMBSs themselves.  Because
the purchaser of a CDS contract on a RMBS pays a regular, quarterly
amount for protection on a particular RMBS security (the reference
obligation in this case), the credit seller is in a position analogous to
holding that RMBS itself.  Assuming no counterparty risk, the risk and
reward in this situation for the CDS seller track the risk of holding the
actual RMBS.  A “synthetic” or artificial CDO then can be created by
bundling credit default swaps into the CDO instead of RMBSs holding
actual mortgages.  Synthetic CDOs took off close to the peak of the real
estate market, in 2005 and 2006.66  Not only did they signal in retro-
spect the peak of the market, they helped lift the real estate markets to
heights beyond which they would have otherwise reached, and greatly
increased the amount of exposure to real estate in the financial system
at large.  In addition, parties such as the big banks with exposure to
CDOs, synthetic or not, were able to offset that risk by purchasing CDS
protection on their assets, thereby shifting risk to other parties in the
financial system, usually to monoline insurers, AIG, and hedge funds
selling CDS protection.  Both as components of synthetic CDOs and as
financial insurance, CDSs added substantially to the amount of expo-
sure to real estate-backed securities in the system.67
CDSs, in their various roles in the financial system, were important,
indirect causes of the financial crisis.  What were the direct, proximate
causes, and how did OTC derivatives intersect with them?  In what fol-
lows, I look at the three most important failures of 2008.  The first, Bear
Stearns, was led to the altar with the backing of the U.S. government;
the second, Lehman Brothers, was allowed to fall into bankruptcy; and
65. See Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Crisis of ’07, 16 J. DERIVATIVES 81
(2008); Steven McNamara, Informational Failures in Structured Finance and Dodd-Frank’s
“Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies,” 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 665,
700–01 (2012).
66. See Mark Whitehouse, Slices of Risk: How a Formula Ignited Market That Burned
Some Big Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A1; Bill Shepherd, The Synthetic CDO Shell
Game: Could The Hottest Market in All of Fixed Income Be A Disaster in The Making?, CAPITAL
MARKETS RISK ADVISORS (May 16, 2005), http://www.cmra.com/press-2005.php.
67. See generally ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12, at 69–74 (CDSs as magnifying
risks in the financial system).
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the third, AIG, was rescued by massive and controversial bailouts.  Only
in the case of AIG are derivatives directly linked to the failure, and even
here it is through their connection to the CDOs that were the heart of
the financial crisis.  In all three cases, however, the indirect causes sit
behind the more obvious direct ones.  Despite the fact that much
remains unknown about the interconnection of firms in the financial
system, the connection between derivatives activity and systemic risk
supplied the impetus for the Dodd-Frank regulation of derivatives
activities.68
1. The Demise of Bear Stearns
The quick collapse of Bear Stearns, the fifth largest investment
bank at the time, was a shot across the bow of the financial markets in
the spring of 2008.  Bear Stearns’s demise was not entirely unforesee-
able; it had to bail out two of its own highly leveraged hedge funds
invested in subprime debt in the summer of 2007, an event that consti-
tuted one of the early warnings of the coming crisis tied to real estate-
backed securities.69  And it had other characteristics that lent itself to
weakness in the event of market turmoil.  It was run by a notoriously
hands-off CEO, Jimmy Cayne, who spent substantial amounts of time at
bridge tournaments and playing golf during his final years at the
helm.70  Real estate-backed securities, derivatives trading, and prime
brokerage services for hedge funds and other financial institutions were
three of Bear Stearns’s particular strengths.  The interplay of these
three business areas allowed rumors to rapidly gain force in the market-
place, leading to its demise over the course of March 9–16, 2008.71
Bear Stearns was the victim of a run on the bank, as its prime brokerage
clients abandoned it due to suspected financial weakness resulting from
its heavy exposure to subprime debt, and other financial institutions
refused to extend it short-term credit in the form of “repo” (repur-
chase) financing.
What is known about Bear Stearns’s financial position going into
its final crisis?  It was highly leveraged, though not to a much greater
extent than its competitors.  It reportedly had approximately $11 bil-
lion of capital, supporting $395 billion in assets, for a leverage ratio of
almost 36:1.72  While that was a dangerously high number, other invest-
ment banks had comparable ratios.73  It also had significant exposure
68. See, e.g., Simon Boughey, After Bear Stearns Scare, Fed Pushes Banks to Form Central
Clearing House for CDS Market, EUROWEEK, June 13, 2008, at 64.
69. See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 285–95 (2010).
70. See Kate Kelly, Bear CEO’s Handling of Crisis Raises Issues; Cayne on Golf Links, 10-
Day Bridge Trip Amid Summer Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A1.
71. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 31, 2008,
available at http://www.cnnmoney.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.for-
tune/.
72. See Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1.
73. See Raghuram Rajan Joins the RBI: Out of the Frying Pan, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10,
2013.
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to subprime securities.  Perhaps most importantly, Bear Stearns had
hundreds of thousands of CDS trades on its books;74 for 2006, Fitch
Ratings ranked Bear Stearns twelfth in terms of trade count and ninth
in notional amount for all credit derivatives transactions.75  The total
notional amount of its derivatives transactions amounted to $13.4 tril-
lion in November 2007, as reported in its November 20, 2007 10-K.76
Of this amount, CDS notional stood at approximately $2.25 trillion.77
This total amount indicates the systemic importance Bear Stearns held
in the financial system, with thousands of counterparties at risk of losses
in the event Bear Stearns were to fail.78
Bear Stearns’s Achilles’ heel, as was the case for Lehman Brothers
seven months later, was its need for repo financing to sustain its financ-
ing position.  To obtain cash for its everyday operations, Bear Stearns
and the other investment banks borrowed billions of dollars through
short-term borrowing under repurchase agreements with other major
financial institutions.  This repo financing allowed Bear Stearns access
to cash secured by longer-term, often illiquid securities; in Bear
Stearns’s case, a substantial percentage of these were RMBS and CDO
securities backed by subprime and other real estate assets.  Without a
constantly replenished supply of cash, the major investment banks
could not fund their day-to-day operations and would quickly fail.79
This left Bear Stearns vulnerable to rumors concerning its solvency.
In the final ten days of its life, these rumors gathered force in the
market and brought down the bank.  As questions surrounding its sol-
vency mounted, certain hedge funds and other institutions began to shy
74. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 663.
75. See Ian Linnell et al., CDX Survey – Market Volumes Continue Growing while New
Concerns Emerge, FITCH RATINGS, July 16, 2007, at 9.  “Credit derivatives” is a broad cate-
gory, including CDS, credit option, credit index, CDO, CLO, CPDO and LCDS (Loan-
Only Credit Default Swaps) transactions.
76. BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), 61 (2008) (“As of
November 30, 2007 and 2006, the Company had notional/contract amounts of approxi-
mately 13.40 trillion and $8.74 trillion, respectively, of derivative financial instruments, of
which $1.85 trillion and $1.25 trillion, respectively, were listed futures and options
contracts.”).
77. See Stulz, supra note 30, at 82 (“[T]he credit default swaps of Bear Stearns may
have amounted to a total notional amount of $2.25 trillion”).
78. For a detailed attempt at a quantitative measure of Bear’s systemic risk, see
Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Default Risk Codependence in the Global Financial System: Was the Bear
Stearns Bailout Justified? (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bcentral.cl/conferencias-seminarios/
seminarios/pdf/Chan-Lau.pdf.  Chan-Lau’s analysis highlights the vulnerability of Bear
(as well as AIG) to “default risk spillovers” from other parties, and hypothesizes that this
was due to its heavy participation in the credit risk transfer markets. Id. at 15.  Chan-Lau’s
paper is an attempt to gauge “unobservable factors likely related to the interconnected-
ness among financial institutions” from observable factors such as the price of CDS pro-
tection on such institutions.  The ultimate success of this strategy presumes that credit
markets are efficient, but noting the discrepancy between his results and the policy deci-
sions of regulators he concludes that credit derivatives markets likely “exhibit at best, only
semi-strong efficiency.” Id. at 3–4.
79. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12, at 11–12 (discussing reliance of banks on
short-term debt); Markus Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 80 (2009) (repo and investment bank balance sheet maturity
mismatch).
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 120 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 120 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 21  1-MAY-14 15:13
2014] FINANCIAL MARKETS UNCERTAINTY AND THE RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT 229
away from using Bear Stearns as a prime broker, with some firms cancel-
ling their agreements with Bear and repossessing the collateral Bear
held for their brokerage activities.80  The other major banks noticed an
increase in requests to assume derivatives trades through novation that
parties had entered into with Bear.  A critical event occurred on March
11, 2008, when a Credit Suisse manager sent an email to derivatives
traders instructing them not to accept novations of Bear Stearns deriva-
tive transactions without first obtaining approval from management.81
When Bear Stearns President Alan Schwartz attempted to stop the dam-
age the following day, it was too late.  Bear Stearns’s counterparties con-
tinued to flee, and prime brokerage clients also left the bank, depriving
it of collateral used to back repo lending.82  The demise of Bear Stearns
was a modern day run on the bank, with the flight of clients replacing
the more familiar lines of depositors withdrawing cash in the event of
bank runs in the 1930s.  When JPMorgan refused to extend an emer-
gency loan to Bear Stearns, on Thursday, March 13, 2008, Bear Stearns
was forced to go to the Federal Government for emergency funding to
stave off immediate collapse.
Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury officials quickly became
involved; in the maelstrom of the crisis, it was decided early the next
day, March 14, 2008, that Bear would be extended emergency financing
through JPMorgan.83  Federal officials were concerned about the possi-
ble effects of a collapse of Bear on the financial markets at large, fear-
ing the possibility of a “daisy chain” meltdown across the financial
markets, particularly in the $400 trillion notional derivatives and much
smaller but crucial $5 trillion repo financing markets.84  Over the week-
end, Bear Stearns executives labored to sell Bear to another institution.
When a deal with the private equity firm J.C. Flowers failed, JPMorgan
agreed to acquire Bear with the backing of a $30 billion guarantee from
the U.S. Federal Government.85  The fire sale price of $2 per share—
80. See Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear
Stearns, Executives Swung from Hope to Despair in the Space of a Week, WALL ST. J., May 28,
2008, at A1.
81. Id.
82. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 286–81
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
83. See Kate Kelly et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady Financial
System; Storied Firm Sees Stock Plunge 47%; J.P. Morgan Steps In, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at
A1.
84. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators, Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and statement of Timothy F. Geither, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=ec013d8f-fe1e-4fb6-a514-ab93be32ad
38&Witness_ID=c52a9dcc-1eb1-474c-a493-461c8fef9afd. [hereinafter Statements of Ben S.
Bernanke and Timothy F. Geithner].
85. See Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied
Last Days; Paulson Pushed Low-Ball Bid, Relented; a Testy Time for Dimon, WALL ST. J., May 29,
2008, at A1; Sidel et al., supra note 72.
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Bear had traded as high as $171.51 in January, 200786—was quickly
raised to $10 per share after the outrage of Bear shareholders became
known.  Nevertheless, investors and employees saw the vast bulk of the
value of their stakes in the company wiped out.
This account of Bear’s rapid demise indicates that defenders of
CDS markets are correct when they point out that derivatives were not
the proximate cause of Bear’s near collapse.  Rather, it was the effects
of rumors regarding Bear’s solvency on its clients, counterparties and
lenders in the short-term repo financing market that were to blame.
Beneath what is known however, is the abyss of collapse in the tightly
interconnected financial markets.  The generalized fear other institu-
tions felt at the prospect of continuing to do business with Bear was
grounded in their immediate self-interest, and a large portion of the
clients fleeing Bear were derivatives counterparties.  On a system-wide
level, moreover, it was fear of the unknown effects of a collapse of the
bank that prompted U.S. financial officials to intervene at the last
moment.87  While this response would not be repeated in the next fail-
ure, as a leader in derivatives transactions Bear was likely more inter-
connected in the financial markets than Lehman Brothers,88 and the
effects of the Lehman collapse were certainly traumatic.  Despite
existing at a remove from the immediate cause of the collapse, the
derivatives activities of Bear appear to have been an indirect cause of its
failure.  Furthermore, the possible effects of an uncontrolled collapse
on the interconnected markets as a whole held a great enough degree
of risk for federal banking officials to agree to its rescue.
2. The Collapse of Lehman Brothers
After the demise of Bear Stearns, the markets entered into a ner-
vous holding pattern in the late spring of 2008.  It was clear to partici-
pants and observers alike that the housing market had crested and that
there would be substantial problems in the financial markets as a result,
but it was hoped that the economy would have a “soft landing” and that
losses in the major financial institutions would not be too severe.  By
June however, news reports indicated that real estate-related losses
could be heavy, and that Lehman Brothers in particular would be seri-
ously affected.89  Lehman Brothers was in fact the next institution to
falter, and its collapse ushered in the financial crisis of 2008.  While the
overall pattern of its collapse followed that of Bear Stearns, there were
important differences, and because it was allowed to fail, the conse-
quences were much more severe.
86. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Chase Pays Only $2 a Share for Troubled Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1, A16.
87. See Statements of Ben S. Bernanke and Timothy F. Geithner, supra note 84.
88. Lehman’s total notional of derivatives exposure at the end of 2007 was $737.9
billion. See LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) 120 (2007) [here-
inafter LEHMAN BROTHERS’S ANNUAL REPORT]. See also Chan-Lau, supra note 78, at Table 1
(“Conditional risk codependence among financial institutions worldwide”).
89. Jeremy Lemer, Lehman Losses and Fed Comments Ruin Hopes for a Bounce, FIN.
TIMES, June 10, 2008, at 26.
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What is known about the financial position of Lehman Brothers
leading up to its collapse?  In June 2008, Lehman management
informed investors that its second quarter losses would amount to $2.8
billion.90  Throughout the summer, Lehman was rumored to be in a
weak financial position, and its CEO, Dick Fuld, was urged to seek addi-
tional capital.91  Fuld, however, seemed to rebuff warnings that his
bank was in a weak position, and failed to make a deal to shore up its
balance sheet.92  In fact, Lehman’s accounting was worse than it
appeared at the time to investors, because it was using a questionable
accounting technique known as “Repo 105” to move risky assets off its
balance sheet for accounting purposes.93  Lehman reported a leverage
ratio of 30.7:1 at the end of 2007, with $691 billion in assets on its bal-
ance sheet and $22 billion equity,94 but such ratio does not take into
account the Repo 105 transactions examined by bankruptcy examiner
Anton Valukas.  Had Lehman not used the Repo 105 transactions,
which removed $39 billion from its balance sheet as the end of 2007, it
would have had a leverage ratio of 33:1.95
As with Bear, Lehman was also a substantial player in the deriva-
tives markets.  The Bank for International Settlements estimates that
the combined derivatives assets and liabilities held by Lehman
amounted to $70.5 billion (market value, not notional), or 0.3% of all
the value of derivatives outstanding.96  In CDSs alone, Lehman was a
party to trades between $3.65 and $5 trillion (notional), comprising
approximately 8% of the total notional amount outstanding in the CDS
sector.97,98
Given its substantial exposures and dependence on short-term
repo financing, Lehman, the smallest of the major investment banks,
was vulnerable to the same types of rumors that brought down Bear.
Like Bear, Lehman battled these rumors, contending that it was being
90. Id.
91. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., The Two Faces of Lehman’s Fall; Private Talks of
Raising Capital Belied Firm’s Public Optimism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at A:1.
92. See James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009.
93. See Ben Hallman, The Repo Man, LEGAL WEEK, Sept. 16, 2010.  In a Repo 105
transaction, immediately before the end of the quarter Lehman would transfer collateral
worth 105% of the value of the cash it received in return from its counterparty in the
deal.  It would then use this cash to pay down short-term liabilities, thereby improving its
balance sheet for financial reporting purposes.  Soon after the quarter ended, Lehman
would repurchase the collateral. See also Ben Hallman, History Lessons, AM. LAW., Sept.
2010.
94. See LEHMAN BROTHERS’S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 29–30.
95. See Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Bros. Hid Borrowing,
Examiner Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1.  Such amounts increased to $50 billion at
the end of the second quarter 2008.
96. See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, (2012), available at
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.11.20_Interconnectedness_and_ Contagion.pdf.
97. See Sheri Markose et al., Too Interconnected to Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic
Risk in Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks
(COMISEF, Working Paper No. WPS-033 2010).
98. In addition to these raw amounts of derivatives exposure, see also Chan-Lau,
supra note 78 (analyzing both Lehman’s susceptibility to the default of others and its role
as a source of risk).
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attacked by hedge funds shorting its stock, which therefore had an
interest in seeing it fail.99  The cost of a CDS covering $10 million of
Lehman debt for five years increased from $219,000 at the end of May,
2008 to around $800,000 by September.100  It had approximately 1.1
million derivatives contracts with thousands of counterparties, amount-
ing to hundreds of billions of dollars by notional value.101  Similar to
Bear, when rumors as to its solvency gathered force in the marketplace
due to questions about the true extent of losses on mortgage-backed
securities on its books, counterparties to its derivatives trades began to
flee, pulling valuable collateral from the firm, at the same time that
other financial institutions refused to roll over the repo agreements
that Lehman, like all the Wall Street banks, relied on for cash.  This
quickly pushed Lehman into bankruptcy during the second week of
September; when it announced third quarter losses of almost $4 billion
on Friday, September 12, its clients and counterparties fled en masse.
After spending the weekend in a fruitless attempt to find a buyer in
either Bank of America or Barclays Bank, Lehman filed for bankruptcy
on September 15.  Its bankruptcy was the largest U.S. bankruptcy filing
in history, with $639 billion in assets.102
3. The Federal Government Rescues AIG
The same weekend Lehman executives frantically searched for a
buyer, while their lawyer Harvey Miller prepared a bankruptcy filing,
AIG, the world’s largest insurer, was also foundering.  While AIG was
not a bank, it carried out extensive operations in the financial system,
most notably as the seller of CDS protection on asset-backed securities,
and like Lehman and Bear it was vulnerable to the decline in the real
estate markets.  This vulnerability, however, came from a different set of
internal and external factors, and its level of interconnection in the
financial, insurance, and pension fund systems prompted the U.S. Fed-
eral Government to rescue it after spurning Lehman only days before.
AIG was also significantly larger than Lehman or Bear, both in
terms of total assets and in interconnectedness in the wider economy.
It was ranked tenth in the 2007 Fortune 500, with assets of $1.06 tril-
lion, supported by $95.8 billion of shareholder equity.103  It was the
world’s largest insurance company, with operations in over 130 coun-
tries, conducting all manner of insurance activities.  Its problems grew
out of its role as provider of CDS protection on ABS sold by its Financial
99. See Patrick Fitzgerald & Mike Spector, Lehman: Och-Ziff Helped Spread Rumors,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2010, at C4.
100. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 91.
101. See Mike Spector & Michael Corkery, What Lehman’s Central Players Knew; Exam-
iner Gives Detailed Look Inside Doomed Firm; ‘Reputational Risk’ and Ignoring ‘Red Flags’, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 19, 2010, at B3.
102. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets; Focus Moves to
Fate of Giant Insurer After U.S. Allows Investment Bank to Fail; Barclays in Talks to Buy Core
Lehman Unit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1.
103. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 946
(2009).
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Products Division, AIGFP, based in London.  Because its parent pos-
sessed a AAA credit rating and massive size, AIGFP was able to engage
in its own form of regulatory arbitrage, using its creditworthiness to
offer insurance on CDOs, RMBSs, and other complex securities at what
was perceived at the time to be minimal cost.104  Due to its size and
credit rating, under the terms of many of its credit default swaps it was
not required to post collateral on such contracts as long as it main-
tained its AAA rating, and the value of the underlying collateral did not
decline.105  While such a business seemed reasonable at the time, on
account of the credit risks in the underlying ABSs indicated by the mod-
els used to price these CDSs,106 in retrospect such a business amounted
to “picking up nickels in front of a steam roller.”107  As of year-end
2007, AIGFP had $527 billion notional worth of CDSs outstanding, the
bulk of which were on super-senior AAA ABSs.108  Of this amount,
$61.4 billion were written on securities backed by subprime real estate
in some way.109
The cause of AIG’s unraveling was more complex than that of Bear
or Lehman, and CDSs were more directly implicated.  As fears grew
concerning the value of securities backed by real estate assets, AIG was
first required to post collateral on its CDSs to cover potential losses on
the underlying securities.110  Due to a significant decline in their value,
AIG needed to post $6 billion of its available $17.6 billion in cash by
July 1, 2008.  The strain on AIG’s cash reserves led to a dynamic similar
to that experienced by the investment banks, as parties to AIG’s securi-
ties lending program, which lent to market participants upon posting
cash collateral, unwound their transactions.  As with Bear and Lehman,
the effect of clients fleeing this program amounted to a run on the
bank, depriving AIG of cash, which had been invested in real estate-
backed securities and which it therefore had to supplement in order to
return its clients’ collateral.111  This amounted to an additional $3.3
billion through August 31, 2008.
As AIG’s cash dwindled, it had difficulty rolling over its short-term
debt in the commercial paper markets, as Bear and Lehman had
before, and its credit rating was downgraded on September 15, 2008.
The downgrades led to the final step in AIG’s faltering, because while it
was not originally required to post collateral on its CDS because of its
AAA rating, the CDS contracts required it to do so in the event of a
downgrade.  The sum of the collateral requirements the week of Sep-
tember 15 came to $20 billion, forcing it to the brink of collapse.  After
meeting with Wall Street banks and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
officials in an unsuccessful attempt to put together a $75 billion lending
104. See BLINDER, supra note 12, at 130–35.
105. See MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 69, at 190–91.
106. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 38.
107. See Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 50.
108. See Sjostrom, supra note 103, at 955.
109. Id. at 959.
110. Id. at 960.
111. Id. at 961–62.
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facility for AIG, the U.S. government announced on September 16,
2008, that it was providing an $85 billion dollar loan.112  With the addi-
tion of a number of other lending facilities over the following months,
this amount increased to a total of $182.5 billion, of which $126.1 bil-
lion was used.113
While the figures above provide a great deal of information about
AIG’s particular levels of exposure and its position in the financial sys-
tem, the ultimate impact had it failed remains of course unknown.114
Regulators, however, were motivated by uncertainty over the possible
effects of its collapse.115  The widespread fear of all informed partici-
pants as it teetered that its collapse could drag down the entire global
financial system prompted the U.S. government to reverse its policy,
enacted just days before with Lehman Brothers, of letting a systemically
important institution fail so as not to encourage “moral hazard” in the
financial system.  Apparently the interconnection of AIG was too great
to risk its collapse, with losses that would reverberate through the CDS
markets, insurance markets of all sorts, and pension and mutual funds
that held AIG stock.  As with Bear Stearns, the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve stepped in after gazing upon the abyss of a
financial markets meltdown.
4. The Shadow Banking System: Too Interconnected To Fail?
The figures discussed above for the derivatives activities and
counterparties of Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG present the basic
information known about the three most important failures of 2007 to
2009.  Other failures include three investment funds at BNP Paribas,
two Bear Stearns hedge funds, and numerous mortgage lenders, as well
as the looming collapse of Merrill Lynch, which was absorbed by Bank
of America.  But Bear, Lehman, and AIG represent the most important
events of the crisis, as they were three of the most highly intercon-
nected, systemically important financial institutions.  Despite what is
known about their substantial derivatives positions at the time, it is cor-
rect to say that derivatives were not the immediate or proximate cause
of the failures of Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers.  Rather, that role
instead goes to losses connected with real estate-backed structured
finance securities and the difficulties the banks then faced in retaining
112. Id. at 963.
113. Id. at 974.
114. But cf. Chan-Lau, supra note 78 (Table 1 indicates that AIG had very high levels
of conditional risk codependence, indicating susceptibility to failure of another major
financial institution, but only average rankings as a source of systemic risk).
115. See The Federal Bailout of AIG, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Govern-
ment Reform, 111th Cong. 107 (2010) (statement of Henry Paulson, Treasury Secretary
during the financial crisis, that “had AIG failed I believe we would have seen a complete
collapse of our financial system . . . .”). See also Sjostrom, supra note 103, at 977–78
(detailing fears of “a domino effect of failures reaching around the world” due to AIG’s
size and interconnection with corporations, financial institutions, investment and pension
funds, and state and local governments).  For various criticisms of the judgment from
uncertainty that motivated U.S. federal officials, see Johnson, supra note 107, and Peter
Wallison, Lack of Candor and the AIG Bailout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28–29, 2009, at A15.
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clients and collateral, and the challenge of obtaining fresh cash in the
repo lending markets after suspicions concerning the extent of these
losses grew.  In the case of AIG, CDSs on CDOs were a much more
direct cause of its near collapse.116
Conversely, it is likely that derivatives were a key indirect cause of
their failures, and that federal government’s pattern of action, inaction,
then action with respect to Bear, Lehman, and AIG respectively illus-
trates that what was unknown at the time about the levels of intercon-
nection in the financial markets was more important than what was
known.  In the pre-crisis world, there was a marked lack of awareness,
and even data, concerning a number of important factors combining to
produce systemic risk in the global financial system.117  This lack of
awareness contributed to the vulnerability of the financial system and
the widespread fear of financial contagion.  It was precisely this fear
that, writ small, led to the failures of Bear and Lehman, and, writ large,
caused the financial markets to seize up and prompted the Fed to
bailout AIG. This fear was fundamentally grounded in the unknown.  When
financial institutions observed the failure of an overleveraged Lehman
Brothers, their first reaction was to curtail lending across the board in
an effort to preserve capital in an environment where the solvency of
other institutions was open to question as well as the general trajectory
of the markets themselves.118  The first and most important way in
which the CDS markets acted as indirect causes of the crisis was as part
of the highly complex and interconnected financial architecture that
inspired the element of fear. Ex ante, OTC derivatives exposures con-
tributed to the uncertainty surrounding the consequences of the likely
insolvency of the major financial institutions due to their exposure to
real estate assets.119
It remains a matter of debate whether or not the fears on account
of interconnectivity were justified ex post.  Two recent theoretical papers
suggest they were: the networks of connections created by OTC deriva-
tives arguably functioned as key channels through which losses were
propagated, leading to increased probability of defaults in the sys-
116. See Stulz, supra note 30, at 90, for the view that it was still the fall in real estate
values that was ultimately to blame for AIG’s woes.  Even granting this, the direct trans-
mission of this shock to AIG occurred through its CDSs written on real estate-backed
CDOs, and so CDSs are implicated in its failure in a way they are not for Bear and
Lehman.
117. See Markose et al., supra note 97, at 8–9; Lo, supra note 60. See also Willem
Buiter, The Unfortunate Uselessness of Most ’State of the Art’ Academic Monetary Economics,
VOXEU.ORG (March 6, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3210.
118. See Prasanna Gai et al., Complexity, Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONETARY
ECON. 453 (2011); Viral V. Acharya & David Skeie, A Model of Liquidity Hoarding and Term
Premia in Inter-bank Markets, 58 J. MONETARY ECON. 1 (2011); William Sterling, Looking Back
at Lehman: An Empirical Analysis of the Financial Shock and the Effectiveness of Countermeasures,
57 MUSASHI U. J. 53 (2009). See also BLINDER, supra note 12, at 141–42 (“Contagion and
Financial Panics”).
119. See Scott, supra note 96, at 52 (although Scott believes these fears were in fact
overblown, “Lehman’s positions” in the OTC derivatives universe “may have been the
most significant cause of concern among market participants and regulators in the run-
up to Lehman’s failure.”).
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tem.120  By creating channels through which contagion can be spread,
OTC derivatives markets themselves can increase the severity of finan-
cial crises.  On the other hand, although he acknowledges the reality of
these fears ex ante,121 Professor Hal Scott argues that in the case of Leh-
man Brothers a retrospective analysis shows that its failure was due to
contagion in the repo market, not interconnectedness created by OTC
derivatives markets.122  Key evidence for this claim is that the settlement
of Lehman’s uncleared OTC derivatives went smoothly, with the vast
bulk of these trades netting out, leaving only between $14 and $22 bil-
lion of final exposure.123  Scott, therefore, argues that fears surround-
ing Lehman’s derivatives exposures were “overblown owing to a general
mischaracterization of the magnitude of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket . . . .  [I]t did not account for as much risk as commonly believed,
due to netting agreements and the difference between notional and
actual market value . . . .”124  This position is in line with those who
emphasize that the direct cause of the failures of 2008 was the failure of
short-term lending, not OTC derivatives.125
Whichever way this debate is resolved, it remains the case that the
ex ante phenomenon of uncertainty was an important element in the
financial crisis, and so on the behavioral level alone connection
through OTC derivatives markets was an important element contribut-
ing to the fears that drove the contagion.126  Furthermore, even if the
skeptics as to the causal role of derivatives in the crisis are correct on
the second point above, there is no guarantee that private parties will
act rationally in the future on this knowledge—old lessons may be for-
gotten, or more likely, new forms of complexity in the financial markets
will arise that give rise to new unknowns and fears that can blossom into
panic in a time of crisis.
120. See Markose et al. supra note 97; Sebastian Heise & Reimer Ku¨hn, Derivatives
and Credit Contagion in Interconnected Networks, 85 EUR. PHYS. J. B. 115 (2012).
121. See SCOTT, supra note 96, at 52.
122. Id. at 52–67.
123. Id. at 62.
124. Id. at 52–53.
125. Scott’s conclusions are commensurate with those of Stulz, supra note 30; Craig
Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION 44 (2009); and Roe, supra note 62.  They are
also commensurate with Chan-Lau’s findings that while AIG, Lehman, and Bear were
highly susceptible to the default of other financial institutions, they represented only aver-
age sources of financial risk. See Chan-Lau, supra note 78, at 16.
126. This point is supported by commentators who believe that a CCP regime may
have beneficial effects on a general behavioral level. See Jorge Chan-Lau et al., Assessing
the Systemic Implications of Financial Linkages, 2 IMF GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 34
(2009) (“financial markets might not have seen the same degree of turmoil” had the true
net extent of Lehman’s CDS positions been known); see also Scott, supra note 96, at 99-100
(“By making ‘counterparty runs’ less likely, clearing might forestall the failure of a weak
financial institution.”) citing Duffie et al., supra note 46, at 11; Adam Levitin, The Tenuous
Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO L.J. 445, 461–63 (2013) (“Clearinghouse as a
Loss Absorber”).
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II. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE: THE WALL STREET TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010
Due to the highly traumatic effects of the recession accompanying
the financial crisis, most importantly the elevated unemployment and
home foreclosures that persisted long after its official end in June 2009,
political leaders faced intense demand for a major regulatory overhaul
of the financial system.  Congress and the Obama administration
worked on various bills throughout 2009 and 2010, and President
Obama signed the massive final product, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” into law on July 20, 2010.
Dodd-Frank totals 847 pages and is divided into sixteen separate titles
covering a host of topics directly and not so directly related to the finan-
cial crisis.  Among its key provisions are the creation of a Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council to oversee systemically important non-bank
financial institutions (Title I), creation of an Orderly Liquidation
Authority to oversee the winding up of systemically significant financial
institutions that face failure (Title II), strengthening of the regulation
of credit rating agencies (Title IX, Subtitle C), the creation of a Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection (Title X), and changes to the regula-
tion of the residential mortgage industry (Title XIV).  Despite its size
and far-reaching impact, Dodd-Frank is to great extent more of a gen-
eral map to future regulation than a final blueprint itself,127 as it calls
for an estimated 398 rule-making exercises on the part of the federal
government and 87 studies concerning myriad aspects of the financial
crisis and proposed regulatory efforts.128
Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the “Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010,” is Congress’s attempt to institute a new reg-
ulatory regime for derivatives activities.  It employs a multi-faceted regu-
latory strategy: first, on the level of the derivatives markets as a whole,
attempt to clear as many derivatives as possible through a CCP
(referred to as a “clearing agency”),129 and second, institute informa-
tion provision requirements.  Title VII also institutes capital, margin
requirements and registration requirements and oversight on individ-
ual entities.130  Furthermore, the swap desk “spin-off” rule also prohib-
its federal bailout assistance to entities engaging in riskier categories of
derivatives activities, thereby forcing banks to carry out such activities in
a separately capitalized affiliate.131  The so-called “Volcker Rule” of
Title VI aims to curb proprietary trading on the part of banks; depend-
ing on its implementation it may have important effects on their deriva-
127. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2012);
BLINDER, supra note 12, at 314–17 (“It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over”).
128. See DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT, JUNE 2012, available at http://
www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank-rulemaking-progress-report.
129. As defined in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A) (2012).
130. Dodd-Frank Act § 764; 15 U.S.C. § 78o–10 (2012).
131. Dodd-Frank Act § 716; 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2012).
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tives activities.132  Since the first two strategies are most germane to the
issues of this Article, this review of Title VII is limited to them.
A note about what follows: Title VII honors the general pre-
existing regulatory division of labor (and territory) between the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities Exchange Com-
mission tracing back to the Shad-Johnson Accord of 1982,133 and has
two largely identical halves: Subtitle A, “Regulation of Over-the-Counter
Swaps Markets,” applies to swaps governed by the CFTC, and Subtitle B,
“Regulation of Security-Based Swap Markets,” applies to “Security-based
Swaps” (“SBSs”), swaps whose underlying obligations would fall under
the jurisdiction of the SEC.134  Since credit default swaps are the focus
of this Article, and they generally fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC,
in what follows I discuss only the applicable provisions from Subtitle B
of Part VII.
A. The Central Counterparty Clearing Mandate
The heart of Title VII, the clearing requirement, is found in Sec-
tion 763 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  It adds new Section 3C, “Clearing for
Security-Based Swaps,” to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act).  The clearing provisions allow for input from both the
SEC and from clearing agencies, but the SEC has ultimate power to
determine whether or not a SBS must be cleared.  New Exchange Act
Section 3C(a) reads:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a security-based
swap unless that person submits such security-based swap for clear-
ing to a clearing agency that is registered under this Act or a clear-
ing agency that is exempt from registration under this Act if the
security-based swap is required to be cleared.135
This mandates that if a SBS is required to be cleared, then it must
be submitted to a clearing agency by any party wishing to engage in it.
132. Dodd-Frank Act § 619; 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). See generally Alison K. Gary,
Comment, Creating a Future Economic Crisis: Political Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker
Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339 (2012).
133. See Daniel P. Collins, Gensler: Correcting the Record on OTC Regulation, FUTURES
MAG. 39.9 (Sept. 2010).  On Shad-Johnson generally, see Roberta Romano, The Political
Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. REG. 279, 357–58 (1997).
134. A “security-based swap” is defined as:
[A]ny agreement, contract or transaction that (i) is a swap, as that term is
defined under section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act” and “(ii) is based on
(I) an index that is a narrow-based security index, including any interest therein
or on the value thereof; (II) a single security or loan, including any interest
therein or on the value thereof, or (III) the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or
extent of the occurrence of an event relating to a single issuer of a security or
the issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index, provided that such
event directly affects the financial statements, financial condition, or financial
obligations of the issuer.
Dodd-Frank Act § 761; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68) (2012).  SBSs also include master agree-
ments and all supplements to a master agreement, such as those entered into pursuant to
ISDA forms.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(B). (2012).
135. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012).
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So far, so good—but what determines whether a SBS is required to be
cleared in the first place?
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-67386 specifies that the
Commission will ultimately determine whether a SBS is required to be
cleared: “If the Commission makes a determination that a security-
based swap is required to be cleared, then parties may not engage in
such security-based swap without submitting it for clearing to a clearing
agency that is either registered with the Commission (or exempt from
registration) unless an exception to the clearing requirement
applies.”136  In making its determination, new Exchange Act Section
3C(b)(4)(B) lists five factors the SEC shall take into account in deter-
mining whether a particular SBS must be cleared: (i) the existence of
significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and ade-
quate pricing data, (ii) the availability of proper financial infrastructure
and operational expertise necessary to clear the contract “consistent
with the material terms and trading conventions on which the contract
is then traded”; (iii) “the effect on the mitigation of systemic risk,” (iv)
“the effect on competition,” and (v) the “existence of reasonable legal
certainty in the event of insolvency” of the relevant CCP.137  New
Exchange Act Section 3C(a)(1) provides a presumption in favor of
clearing, reflecting the belief on the part of the drafters that it was
important that as many derivatives as possible be centrally cleared and
that exceptions to the mandate be narrowly construed.138
Nevertheless, the clearing agencies appear to have a say on what is
to be cleared, and there will be important categories of swaps that are
not cleared.  First, the structure of Exchange Act Section 3C makes it
evident that clearing agencies have an input into the clearing require-
ment process: Section 3C(b)(2) requires clearing agencies to submit
SBSs they plan to accept for approval to the SEC.139  Second, there are
important categories of swaps that are not required to be cleared: those
used by non-financial businesses to hedge business risks (the “end user
exemption”), and those that no clearing agency accepts for clearing.140
The statute indicates this last category indirectly, as it is not explicitly
listed but is the subject of Section 3C(d), “Prevention of Evasion.”141
The SEC is instructed to investigate when it finds that a SBS “would
otherwise be subject to mandatory clearing but no clearing agency has
136. See Process for Submissions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for Mandatory Clearing
and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agencies; Technical Amendments for Rule 19b-4 and
Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-Regulatory Agencies, Exchange Act Release 67286, 77 Fed.
Reg. 41601, 41604 (July 13, 2012).
137. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(4)(B) (2012)
138. See REPORT OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
REGARDING THE RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. 111–176, at
35 (2010) (“the legislation permits regulators to exempt contracts from the exchange and
clearing requirements based on . . . narrow criteria.”).
139. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(b)(2) (2012).
140. For discussions of the exceptions to the clearing mandate and their impor-
tance, see Coffee, supra note 127, at 1064; Kristin Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the
Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 239–42 (2011).
141. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(d) (2012).
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listed” it.142  Although the SEC is prohibited from forcing a clearing
agency to list a particular SBS for clearing, it has the authority to
impose margin requirements on uncleared SBSs,143 and presumably it
could forbid the use of a particular SBS entirely under its general
authority under 3C(a)(1).144  Finally, Title VII also facilitates exchange
trading of derivatives through the non-mandatory structure of a secur-
ity-based swap execution facility (SBSEF).  New Section 3C(h) instructs
that SBSs subject to clearing shall be executed on exchanges or SBSEFs,
but grants an exemption to this where no exchange or SBSEF lists the
particular SBS.145
The clearing requirement in new Exchange Act Section 3C
presents a major change to the derivatives markets and has provoked
extensive criticism as well as support, which Part III below examines.
Like much else in Dodd-Frank, it is subject to regulatory implementa-
tion and its precise contours are only now, three years after its passage,
coming into focus.  While a certain portion of the derivatives markets
currently trades through a CCP, the great majority of credit default
swaps do not.146  Central counterparty clearing has arisen through the
independent initiative of dealers and other market participants in a
variety of circumstances, but there are likely many circumstances in
which market participants, acting alone without any governmental man-
date, will not find it economically desirable.147  While it is intended to
reduce systemic risk, reaching this goal will require considerable effort
on the part of government regulators and those running the CCPs, as
well as the compliance of market participants.
B. Public Availability of Transaction Data
Equally important as the clearing requirement may be the public
information requirements for the derivatives markets.  In fact, because
the major derivatives dealers have benefited so greatly from the lack of
public information concerning derivatives prices, this may in the end
have an even greater impact on the derivatives markets than the clear-
ing requirements.148  If transaction data becomes widely available, as it
142. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(d)(2) (2012).
143. See Dodd-Frank Act § 764; 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
144. See generally Barry Le Vine, Comment, The Derivative Market’s Black Sheep: Regula-
tion of Non-Cleared Security-Based Swaps under Dodd-Frank, 31 NW. INT’L. J. L. & BUS. 699
(2011).  Le Vine observes that “to Congress, non-cleared [SBSs] were [generally] an after-
thought, punted to the SEC and CFTC . . . .” Id. at 703.
145. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(h) (2012).
146. BIS states that of the $22.9 trillion total notional amount of CDS outstanding
as of Dec. 31, 2011, $2.7 trillion, or 11.7%, were reported by CCPs. See Credit Default
Swaps, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (June 2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/
otcder/dt21.pdf.
147. See Kroszner, supra note 18 (discussing the private development of structures
in the OTC derivatives markets to control counterparty risk); Litan, supra note 22, at 8
(emphasizing the informational advantages derivatives dealers derive through the current
system); Levitin, supra note 126, at 450 n.15.
148. See Levitin, supra note 126, at 456-58, for a discussion of the possible informa-
tional advantages of the CCP clearing regime over that of banks as dealers. But cf. Culp,
supra note 41, at 34, for the argument that the market already supplies the relevant infor-
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must under Dodd-Frank, the ability of the derivatives dealers to earn
such great profits from their trading is likely to be substantially dimin-
ished.  In fact, much of the resistance to CCP clearing on the part of
major financial institutions may be a consequence of the requirement
that the transaction data generated by the CCP be made publicly
available.149
New Exchange Act Section 13(m), entitled “Public Availability of
Security-Based Swap Transaction Data,”150 provides a blanket informa-
tion reporting mandate for all SBS transactions.  The SEC “is author-
ized to provide by rule for the public availability of security-based swap
transaction, volume, and pricing data” in four categories of SBSs, which
in fact cover all SBS transactions.  Real-time public reporting is
required for: (i) SBSs subject to the mandatory clearing requirement of
3C(a)(1), including those exempted under the 3C(g) hedging excep-
tion; (ii) those not subject to the mandatory clearing requirement but
which are cleared at a registered clearing agency anyway; (iii) those not
cleared under the [3C(f)]151 clearing transition rules, which require
reporting to a Security-Based Swap Data Repository or to the Commis-
sion; and (iv) those under review by the SEC under Section 3C(b).152
Consequently, transaction data for all SBSs must be provided to the
market through a Security-Based Swap Data Repository.  Such reporting
mechanisms shall ensure that the publicly reported information does
not identify the participants, therefore keeping individual transaction
information confidential.153  Nevertheless, the reporting of data in real
time is likely to deprive the dealers of some of the substantial informa-
tional advantages they have hitherto possessed over parties coming to
them seeking derivatives transactions.
In addition to the public dissemination of transaction data, new
Exchange Act Section 13(n), “Security-Based Swap Data Reposito-
ries,”154 requires that the data collected from market participants be
made available on a confidential basis to a variety of governmental
departments, including prudential regulators, the Financial Stability
mation. See also Anne Duquerroy et al., Credit Default Swaps and Financial Stability: Risks
and Regulatory Issues, BANQUE DE FRANCE, 13 FIN. STABILITY REV. 75 (2009) (Table 1: Main
sources of global data on the CDS market).
149. See generally Litan, supra note 22; see also Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677;
Awrey, supra note 37, at 261–62 (rents flowing to financial intermediaries on account of
their informational advantages). See also Louise Story, House Advantage; A Secret Banking
Elite Rules Derivatives Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A1; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra
note 12, at 71 (arguing that derivatives traders benefit from complex trading strategies
that are opaque to both competitors and supervisors).
150. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(m) (2012).
151. Note that the text of the statute appears to be mistaken here, as it refers to
“section 3C(a)(6),” which does not exist.  By analogy with Dodd-Frank Act § 727, which
provides for public information reporting requirement for derivatives under the jurisdic-
tion of the CFTC, it is clear that the drafters intended to refer to the clearing transition
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(f) (2012).
152. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(m) (2012).
153. See also new Exchange Act § 13(n)(5)(F), which requires that an SBSDR main-
tain the privacy of data provided it by counterparties. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(n)(5)(F) (2012).
154. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(n) (2012).
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Oversight Council, the CFTC, DOJ and “any other person that the
Commission determines to be appropriate,” including foreign financial
authorities.  The SBSDRs are obviously intended to serve as data collec-
tors for regulatory authorities in the event of financial crisis, or suspi-
cions about the conduct of particular parties in the marketplace.  The
implications of Sections 13(m) and 13(n) are significant, as it should, if
properly implemented, allow market participants and regulators access
to a wide universe of data much of which has previously been unavaila-
ble or at least not easily accessible.
In sum, these requirements represent a major step forward in the
regulation of entities conducting derivatives operations.  Financial insti-
tutions will incur significant expense to comply with them, and the
SEC, CFTC, and other regulators will bear significant burdens in writ-
ing regulations and coping with the flow of information the new regime
channels their way.  It is too soon to tell whether the government will be
able to use this information in a manner that justifies the cost of pro-
ducing it, but arguably government officials could have detected the
systemic risk that resulted in the disasters discussed in Part I much
sooner had such information been available.  If information is not even
available, it cannot be used.155  More importantly, if a well-functioning
clearing and information-provision regime were in place in 2008, the
element of uncertainty that was, at least ex ante, attributable to intercon-
nections in the shadow-banking system may have been removed from
financial marketplace as participants and regulators dealt with the col-
lapse in value of real estate-backed MBSs and CDOs.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DODD-FRANK TITLE VII
Title VII of Dodd-Frank represents a wholesale restructuring of a
large and critical financial market, and as such was bound to be contro-
versial.  Intellectually, the introduction of a new and detailed regulatory
schema challenges many long-standing beliefs about how markets
populated largely by sophisticated parties function best, while politically
Title VII responds to the desperation many in the public at large felt in
the wake of the financial crisis and Great Recession.  And as far as the
major investment banks are concerned, new market infrastructure,
information disclosure requirements and regulatory costs all represent
threats to very profitable lines of business.  The controversy surround-
ing the new derivatives regulation is multi-faceted, with purely intellec-
tual and nakedly political concerns intersecting with powerful financial
interests.
I argue that, with caveats, Title VII is superior both to doing noth-
ing, and to certain proposals which advocate shifting the focus of regu-
latory efforts to a self-regulatory organization (SRO).  While the critics
of Title VII raise a number of important points, they are better under-
stood as warnings regarding possible dangers that the regulators
empowered by Dodd-Frank must watch out for than reasons to abandon
155. See Lo, supra note 60, at 12.
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its regulatory project.  My argument is ultimately grounded in Rawlsian
political theory, though it also has strong, yet not uncontested, empiri-
cal support.  I argue that the very fact of considerable uncertainty sur-
rounding the derivatives markets, and the effect this uncertainty then
had on market participants during the crisis of 2008, points to the use-
fulness of a Rawlsian framework in understanding the problem of deriv-
atives regulation.
Part IV below presents this argument.  Before reaching this point,
Part III first examines the arguments heretofore offered both for and
against Title VII, focusing on CCP clearing, looking at both the techni-
cal points each side in the debate makes as well as the more theoretical
positions implicit in the arguments for and against.
A. Arguments for the Central Counterparty Clearing Mechanism
Given the disasters recounted in Part I above, many are inclined to
support strong derivatives regulation, and indeed Congress and the
Obama administration were able to pass a potentially strong reform bill
in Title VII of Dodd-Frank, although its ultimate strength depends on
the character of the regulations that will be written to implement it.
The larger goal of Title VII is to reduce both the likelihood of an irrup-
tion of systemic risk as occurred in September, 2008 as well as the sever-
ity of a crisis should one occur.156  While the decision not to rescue
Lehman was grounded in a legitimate fear of moral hazard, as its rescue
would have sent a powerful signal to market participants that there was
a policy of bailing out teetering financial institutions, U.S. government
officials were not able to maintain this stance days later when the larger
and more interconnected AIG began to fail.  It is important to empha-
size that the bailout was fundamentally motivated by uncertainty, in the
form of fear of the unknown: officials feared, but did not know, what
the consequences of letting AIG fail would have been.157  The propo-
nents of derivatives regulation hope that by forcing as many derivatives
currently traded OTC as possible to clear through a CCP clearing
mechanism, they will fundamentally reduce the risk of failure of a
major derivatives counterparty, with all its attendant effects.  The reduc-
tion of systemic risk will result, it is hoped, from the operation of the
various features used by a CCP to reduce counterparty risk.
1. Technical Points
The use of a CCP to clear derivatives transactions offers, at least in
certain circumstances, significant benefits to market participants and by
extension, the financial markets and society as a whole.  By instituting
what is essentially a risk mutualization scheme, the CCP functions as a
sort of self-funded insurance program for market participants, and
156. See REPORT OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
REGARDING THE RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 31–35 (2010); Gary Gensler, Clearinghouses Are the Answer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
2010, at A21.
157. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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clearing organizations have on occasion arisen without government
mandate.158  A CCP uses a number of techniques to lessen the risk that
the failure of a CM will disrupt the functioning of a particular deriva-
tives market as a whole.
When counterparties clear a derivatives trade through a CCP, the
CCP interposes itself between both parties, and the original trade is
replaced by two new identical, offsetting trades.  This is novation.  The
CCP therefore assumes all credit risk in the transaction, the risk that
either counterparty will not fulfill its obligations.  On the other hand,
because the CCP holds two offsetting mirror contracts, it ordinarily
bears no market risk in the transaction—if it loses money on one, it will
gain an equal amount on the other.159  In addition to the assumption
of credit risk, a CCP, at least in certain circumstances, reduces risk
through the following mechanisms.
a. Restriction of Trading to Clearing Members
The first line of defense against default is that trading is restricted
to CMs, and a non-member institution may trade through the CCP only
if it carries out this trade through a CM.  Requirements for becoming
and remaining a CM include allowing the CCP to monitor a party’s
creditworthiness, agreeing to follow risk management protocols, and
maintaining adequate levels of capital.160
b. Margin Requirements
Second, the risk embodied in particular derivatives is lessened
through margin requirements for each transaction.  Initial margin will
be posted based on the perceived risk of the trade, and as this risk fluc-
tuates on a daily or even twice daily basis, variation margin will be
required to offset the current risk of the transaction.  The CCP adjusts
the variation margin required in response to changes in the perceived
risk of a transaction.  The amounts of variation required, or “settlement
prices,” are usually made available to the public, thereby increasing the
transparency of the CDS trading system.161
c. Loss Mutualization Fund
CCPs require CMs to contribute to a loss mutualization fund, a
standing insurance pool all members contribute to that can be drawn
on in the event a CM defaults and the CCP is required to absorb losses
from its trades.162  In addition to the insurance fund, a CCP also has a
158. See Kroszner, supra note 18, at 600–04.
159. This presumes that markets are functioning normally. See Bliss & Papathanas-
siou, supra note 54, at 4; Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 25; Levitin, supra note 126,
at 452. Cf. Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO.
L.J.  387, 428–29 (2012) (arguing that ultimately, clearinghouses are exposed to the eco-
nomic risk inherent in derivatives contracts).
160. See Culp, supra note 41, at 15.
161. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 15.
162. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 25.
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set of default protocols that ensure that defaults are processed in an
orderly way, thereby removing much of the uncertainty and instability
surrounding a member default.  In this regard, it is noteworthy to com-
pare the fate of the cleared versus uncleared trades that Lehman Broth-
ers was a counterparty to at the time of its failure.  The cleared trades in
futures contracts suffered no losses, while Lehman’s uncleared trades
resulted in billions of dollars of losses.163
d. Multilateral Netting
In addition to these three insurance-like mechanisms, a CCP
reduces systemic risk through multilateral netting.  It automatically
cancels out chains of duplicating transactions that arise when parties,
particularly major derivatives dealers, enter into trades to hedge the
market risk of particular derivatives they have sold.164  For example,
assume that derivatives dealer JPMorgan sells credit protection to a
hedge fund on General Electric debt.  As a dealer, JPMorgan is likely to
enter into an offsetting transaction with another derivatives dealer,
purchasing the same credit protection from, say, Bank of America.
Bank of America in turn may purchase offsetting credit protection on
this trade, and so on.  In this way, duplicating trades proliferate
through the financial system, greatly increasing the sum of notional
derivatives exposures.  While such exposures would net out in the event
of collapse of the market, the administrative and operational complica-
tions of sorting through and cancelling out such duplicative trades is
substantial, greatly increasing the pain of default by a major
counterparty.  Multilateral netting operates by searching out duplicative
trades among numerous counterparties and cancelling them out.  It is
an automatic risk reduction function carried out by a CCP that has
access to the trade information of its CMs.
e. The CCP as Information Provision Center
CCPs also reduce systemic risk through the provision of informa-
tion to their CMs, regulators and the public as a whole.  By making
settlement prices for derivatives publicly available, CCPs function as an
information gathering and dissemination mechanism.165  This informa-
tion provision function has important effect on the market, greatly
reducing the trading costs for CMs,166 and ultimately reducing systemic
risk by signaling to CMs the true risk they are exposed to as counterpar-
ties to derivatives transactions.  The provision of more accurate risk
163. For the contrast of Lehman’s cleared versus uncleared trades, see Chander &
Costa, supra note 4, at 655-59.  Professor Scott emphasizes that Lehman’s OTC derivatives
were eventually resolved with much less disruption than initially feared, but some of these
derivatives were centrally cleared. See Scott, supra note 96, at 54-67.
164. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 26. See also infra, Part III.B.1.b.
165. Chander & Costa emphasize this function of CCPs. See supra note 4, at 30–31.
Duffie on the other hand disagrees; see Bill Snyder, Credit Default Swap Clearing Plan Won’t
Work, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
news/research/duffie_clearinghouse.html.
166. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 18, at 26.
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information through the mechanism of price will enable market partici-
pants to have a clearer understanding of the risks they are exposed to,
and to hedge where necessary167  (As discussed below, this also cuts
into the informational advantages of the major derivatives dealers.)168
Another potentially crucial aspect of the information collection and
provision function is that the CCP can reduce the opacity of the system
as a whole for regulators.169  In the case of AIG’s CDSs on ABS CDOs,
for example, while they would not have been subject to clearing since
they were too customized, if the information provision requirements in
Dodd-Frank had been in place in 2008 government officials would have
had earlier and better knowledge of their existence, amounts, and
counterparties.
f. The CCP as a Locus for Regulation
A final benefit of the new regime is that the CCP provides a locus
for regulation.  In the lead up to the credit crisis, the major derivatives
dealers and institutions such as AIG acted as independent and, as far as
their derivatives operations were concerned, unregulated hubs—each a
mini-CCP.170  Under the new regime, the CCP, or “clearing agency,”
will be a locus for regulatory efforts.  The SEC, CFTC and other govern-
ment agencies will have a single set of institutions to focus their regula-
tory efforts on, with defined roles and obligations in the financial
system.171  From a regulatory perspective, the institution of the clearing
agency greatly simplifies and focuses the task of regulating OTC deriva-
tives trading.
In sum, the proponents of Title VII believe that these various struc-
tural aspects of a CCP will reduce the systemic risk associated with OTC
derivatives trading, and even its detractors acknowledge their benefits
in certain circumstances.172  By lessening the likelihood that an institu-
tion engaging in derivatives transactions will fail, and the consequences
if it does, membership requirements, margin requirements, a loss
mutualization fund, agreed upon default protocols, and information
dissemination all reduce the systemic risk inherent in the OTC deriva-
tives market.  The CCP itself serves to cabin the shockwaves to the finan-
167. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 15.
168. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
169. See Litan, supra note 22, at 31.
170. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677 (“It is important to recognize that
Bear, Lehman, and AIG also each concentrated risk—they served as de facto unregulated
central clearing counterparties, without the disciplines of a regulated CCP.”).
171. Id. at 37.
172. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 3 (“In conditions of complete information, a
clearinghouse can improve welfare by allocating default losses more efficiently.”); Duffie
& Zhu, supra note 50, at 3 (“While the central clearing of derivatives can in principle offer
substantial reductions in counterparty risk, we provide a foundation for concern that
these benefits may be lost through a fragmentation of clearing services.”); Mark Roe,
Clearinghouse Over-Confidence, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.project-syn-
dicate.org/commentary/roe6/English (“Whether the clearinghouse reduces systemic risk
depends on the relative systemic importance of those inside and outside the clearing-
house . . . .”).
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 129 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 129 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 39  1-MAY-14 15:13
2014] FINANCIAL MARKETS UNCERTAINTY AND THE RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT 247
cial system that would otherwise reverberate out in the event of the
failure of a member.173
It is important to observe that the argument for the overall risk-
reduction enabled by a CCP takes a broad view of the incentives
counterparties will have under CCP clearing.  Critics such as Craig Pir-
rong and Mark Roe argue that because of how multilateral netting
operates, a CCP does not fundamentally eliminate risk, but instead
redistributes it from the CMs to the non-CM counterparties of a failing
CM.174  Therefore, in the event of collapse of a CM, total losses will be
equivalent with a CCP to those without a CCP; the difference is who will
actually be forced to bear them.  The argument that a CCP will funda-
mentally reduce systemic risk operates on a different and fundamen-
tally broader plane: because a CCP is in place, the failure of an
individual CM is less likely to begin with, as its counterparties (who in
the case of the highly concentrated banking sector may also be other
CMs) are less likely to engage in a ‘run’ on a weak institution because
they will be assured that its derivatives will be backstopped by the CCP
in the event of a crisis.175  As well as acting to cabin risks should a fail-
ure occur, a CCP has a general prophylactic role, since its very existence
serves to lessen the likelihood of an initial failure.  By changing the
incentives of counterparties, namely, removing the incentives to with-
draw from all relationships with a clearing member who may be in dis-
tress, a CCP can be a confidence-bolstering device that reduces the
spread of contagion in the financial markets.
2. Philosophic Character of the Arguments in Favor
Proponents of CCP clearing believe that the various mechanisms
reviewed above will reduce systemic risk.  On its face, the claim that
they will do so is plausible: even its opponents believe that, in certain
173. See Levitin, supra note 126, at 451 (“Clearinghouses use their mutual insurance
features to diffuse losses out across their membership on a pro rata basis, thereby avoid-
ing catastrophic losses to any single institution and preventing cascades of failure.”). See
also the authorities cited supra, note 126.
174. Craig Pirrong, supra note 125, at 47; Roe, supra note 172; Roe, supra note 62.
On the other hand, Adam Levitin points out that “the problem Professor Roe identifies is
one of systemic-risk transfer, not generation.  Unless we believe that parties outside the
clearinghouses are more systemically important than those in the clearinghouses, it is
hard to see this transfer as deleterious.”  Levitin, supra note 126, at 465.
175. For this line of argument, see Chan-Lau et al., supra note 126, at 34; Duffie et
al., supra note 45, at 11; see also Scott, supra note 96, at 66–67 (“[C]learing houses may also
have helped mitigate contagion problems by reducing reduce systemic risk across the
OTC derivatives universe.”); Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality:
Centralized Versus Over-the-Counter Markets 37 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1788187.  Although Pirrong is of course highly skeptical that
CCPs will actually reduce systemic risk, he does acknowledge this argument; see Pirrong, A
Bill of Goods: CCPs and Systemic Risk 11, available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/Pirrong_Paper.pdf (“[R]aising priority of
derivatives reduces the incentive of derivatives counterparties to run.”). See also infra Part
IV.B.1, where I make a general argument for the effectiveness of the clearing mandate
along Rawlsian lines.
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circumstances, a CCP regime should reduce risk.176  As Craig Pirrong
remarks, however, in coming to an accurate understanding of clearing,
“the devil is truly in the details.”177  The argument then is whether risk
reduction will really take place given the current institutional, regula-
tory, and economic circumstances surrounding derivatives trading.
Debate arises at the point where the discussion necessarily takes leave of
the purely factual and draws on theories of how markets work, as well as
normative beliefs such as how they work best and their wider purpose
for human society.  The ‘theoretical’ here accordingly refers to the
body of economic and philosophic positions that are implicit in the
arguments for and against CCP clearing and the imposition of the
other rules of Title VII.  Part III.A.2 examines the wider theoretical sup-
ports for the pro-regulatory position.
a. Epistemological Tolerance, the Importance of the Behavioral, and the
Priority of Safety Over Efficiency
If one is to argue for CCP clearing and the other features of Title
VII, tolerance of a certain amount of uncertainty is required, because
the argument for CCP clearing relies on the supposition that something
probable was in fact the case: that interconnectivity due to OTC deriva-
tives was a significant contributing cause of the credit crisis.  As
reviewed above in Part I.B.4, there is a strong argument for this view,
but Pirrong, Roe, and others disagree.178  Professor Scott, who acknowl-
edges that interconnectivity could facilitate the spread of financial con-
tagion, argues that in the case of Lehman Brothers at least,
interconnectivity was not a significant underlying cause of its failure,
although fears of a derivatives disaster could have played a significant
role beforehand.179  On the other hand, there are significant theoreti-
cal accounts of how interconnectivity through derivatives can lead to
systemic failures, and the widespread conventional wisdom then and
now is that linkage of institutions through derivatives was a significant
cause of the crisis.180  That said, in a system as complex as that of mod-
ern finance, and where knowledgeable commentators disagree, it is
going too far to claim as a matter of absolute certainty that interconnec-
tion through derivatives was a central cause of the crisis.  This may be
likely, but it is not absolutely certain.
Following from and related to this point are two further theoretical
supports to the argument for central clearing.  The first is the role of
the behavioral.  As described above, at a very general level, a CCP
should serve to reduce systemic risk by reassuring a troubled institu-
tion’s counterparties that in fact the CCP itself stands behind its CM’s
trades, resulting in a reduced likelihood of a run in the first place.181
176. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
177. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, ISDA DIS-
CUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 1, at 4 (2011).
178. See supra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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In its general prophylactic role, a CCP supplies a measure of confi-
dence to the market.
Second, the argument for a CCP places a very high value on the
safety and stability of the financial system.  This value is so great that,
despite imposing significant net efficiency costs on the derivatives trad-
ing regime itself, CCP clearing could still be thought desirable.  As dis-
cussed further below, this gives rise to two questions: how wide is the
frame of reference for evaluating costs and benefits here?  And more
radically, can factors other than the conventional ones included in cost
benefit analyses be included as reasons for wanting a CCP regime?
While these are very difficult questions to arrive at definitive conclu-
sions on, because the complexity of the system makes it difficult to have
confidence in whatever quantitative measures can be arrived at,182 an
argument for CCP clearing is greatly strengthened by first taking a wide
frame of reference in making any cost benefit analyses, and second,
including factors not usually taken into account in such analyses.
b. Pragmatism
Second, the pro-CCP position appears to reflect a belief that it is
better to act than to stand by in times of crisis, even when there is sub-
stantial uncertainty as to causes and consequences.183  In the case of
OTC derivatives, this results in the belief that it is better to attempt to
institute some controls believed to reduce systemic risk than to turn
away either because of uncertainty about the exact role of the deriva-
tives market in the crisis or because of possible unintended conse-
quences of instituting complex rules in an already complex and opaque
system.184  The stance of acting in the face of uncertainty can be char-
acterized as “pragmatic” in the sense of acting without an overarching
scientific or theoretical background, as when policymakers pursue poli-
cies thought to bring about desirable consequences without however
attempting to justify these actions in terms of a larger theoretical frame-
work.185  It also evidences affective states of both fear and optimism:
fear of the catastrophic consequences of an economic disaster resulting
from an out-of-control financial system, and optimism concerning the
government’s ability to regulate this system.  To some extent, these
emotional or affective spurs to action are beliefs outside the realm of
182. See Pirrong, supra note 125, at 45.
183. This is akin to the argument for the “precautionary principle” in environmen-
tal regulation, which mandates acting in the face of possible environmental threat even
where such dangers are fully understood. See generally Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precau-
tionary Principle, J. POL. PHIL. 14(1) 33–60 (2006); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic
Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003).
184. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12, at 9–10 (discussion of “bugbears,” possi-
ble unintended consequences meant to “scare policymakers out of doing something”).
185. Pragmatism is an anti-foundationalist philosophy, abjuring the quest to
ground knowledge in overarching theoretical frameworks. See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal
Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2077–78 (1996).  For a
discussion of the Pragmatist philosophers John Dewey and William James in the context
of American business practice and public policy, see generally William H. Simon, The Insti-
tutional Configuration of Deweyan Democracy, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957332.
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the provable and scientific, but they do seem to have played a part in
motivating the regulatory project of Title VII.186
c. Broad Motives for Regulation
A third and largely unspoken motive behind the pro-mandate
argument seems to be to alter the distribution of economic benefits
obtained from the derivatives markets, reducing the revenues flowing
to the major banks that control the American derivatives markets while
smaller institutions are allowed into the market and non-dealer
counterparties trade on the basis of improved price information.187
The five major derivatives dealers, characterized as the “Dealers Club”
by Robert Litan, earn approximately $30 billion a year from their deriv-
atives activities.188  For the period 2009 to 2011, this averages 7.75% of
the largest five banks’ quarterly revenues, though it varies significantly
for each bank, and for each bank from quarter to quarter.189  In the
case of Goldman Sachs, an average of 54.58% of its quarterly revenues
in this period came from derivatives activities, with amounts varying
from 7% in the 4th Quarter of 2010 to 72% in the 4th Quarter of
2009.190  Clearing advocates hope that by requiring much greater dis-
semination of trade information, the informational advantages the
dealer banks possess will be substantially lessened, and the costs to
smaller institutions and end-users of hedges will correspondingly
decrease.191  And by reducing one of the banks’ major income streams,
perhaps the size and influence of these institutions in the United States
and global financial systems will be reduced, thereby accomplishing
indirectly what advocates of a break-up of the banks or the re-institution
of Glass Steagall were unable to mandate directly in the reform process
that led to Dodd-Frank.
To review, three key theoretical characteristics of the argument in
favor of the clearing mandate are: 1) tolerance of less-than-certain
knowledge as a key factual basis justifying clearing, as well as acknowl-
186. See, e.g., CHRIS DODD, REPORT OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS REGARDING THE RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S.
REP. NO. 111-176 at 29–32 (2010) (detailing “concerns” about possible “danger” and
“harm” from unregulated derivatives trading).  From a considerably different perspective,
see Peter J. Wallison, The Dodd-Frank Act: Creative Destruction, Destroyed, AEI ONLINE (Aug.
30, 2010), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-policy/the-dodd-frank-act-crea-
tive-destruction-destroyed/ (characterizing the Dodd-Frank Act as a product of “fear of
instability and change”).
187. See, e.g., Joe Rennison, Brady’s Hunch, RISK MAG., Nov. 2011 (“An unstated aim
of the Dodd-Frank Act is to open up the over-the-counter derivatives market to new
entrants, loosening the stranglehold enjoyed by the big dealers and dealer-backed clear-
ing and trading venues.”).
188. See Litan, supra note 22, at 8.
189. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRAD-
ING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FIRST QUARTER 2012 (Graph 6B, Quarterly Trading Reve-
nue as a Percentage of Gross Revenue Cash & Derivative Positions), available at
www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq112.pdf.
190. Id.
191. See Sarah N. Lynch, Gensler Criticizes Resistance to OTC Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar.
12, 2010, at C7.
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edgement of the likely behavioral effects of a CCP and a very high prior-
ity assigned to the safety and stability of the financial system; 2)
“pragmatism,” with action favored over inaction even where we are
forced to regulate in conditions of uncertainty; and 3) the use of regu-
lation for a purpose extrinsic to the derivatives trading system itself, i.e.,
to reduce the size of the big banks.  Common to all three characteristics
is a methodological flexibility and broadness, where we do not demand
knowledge of the highest scientific character to justify a path of action,
and we acknowledge a spectrum of possible reasons broader than just
the efficiency of the financial system itself as legitimate bases for finan-
cial regulation.  In this way, the regulatory project of Dodd-Frank Title
VII takes a holistic view of the financial system: since we strongly sus-
pect, although we cannot really be certain, that derivatives trading was a
major behind-the-scenes factor in the credit crisis, other outside rea-
sons to regulate it, including the desire to reduce the size of the largest
banks, are important in making this decision.  This holistic view of the
financial system is combined with a pragmatic perspective, where the
bar for action is not set so high that we cannot act without absolutely, or
even reasonably, certain knowledge.  In the language of civil procedure,
a “preponderance of the evidence” will suffice where the possible con-
sequences of failing to act are thought to be potentially catastrophic.
B. Arguments Against the Clearing Mandate
Turning from the supporters of Title VII, the mandate’s critics pre-
sent a variety of arguments why they believe it is unwise.  The most sus-
tained criticism of the clearing mandate has come from financial
economist Craig Pirrong of the University of Houston, with Darrell Duf-
fie of Stanford University and Mark Roe of Harvard Law School also
issuing important cautionary warnings.  Other legal scholars voicing
skepticism concerning the Dodd-Frank derivatives reforms include
Zachary Gubler, and to lesser extent, Kristin Johnson and Yesha
Yadav.192  Part III.B presents a summary of the criticisms of Title VII,
focusing on both feared consequences and questions surrounding the
feasibility of implementation of the new regulatory structure, before
moving to the more general philosophic implications of the arguments
against Title VII.
192. Professor Scott offers qualified support for the CCP mandate at the same time
that he argues that interconnectedness was not a primary cause of the financial crisis. See
SCOTT, supra note 96, at 99–104.  The title of Professor Adam Levitin’s The Tenuous Case
for Derivatives Clearinghouses seems to belie its very plausible account of how CCP will
reduce systemic risk; see Levitin, supra note 126, at 453, 461–63.  He concludes that
“[h]opefully clearinghouses will be a belt-and-suspenders approach that results in better
risk management and more resilience to losses.  But on both counts, the devil lies in the
details, which are ultimately in control of federal regulators, and thus it is still too early
for clarity on clearinghouses.” Id. at 466.
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1. Technical Points
a. Exacerbation of Informational Asymmetries
At the center of the argument against clearing is the claim that, in
practice, a CCP is subject to significant informational asymmetries aris-
ing from the varying abilities and incentives of its own managers and its
clearing members.  In the case of bilateral trading, a party has a great
incentive to accurately assess the risk of trading with any particular
counterparty.  The current bilateral market dominated by the five larg-
est banks allows counterparties to do this.  The derivatives dealers pos-
sess detailed, often proprietary, information on their counterparties as
well as the resources necessary to analyze it, employing sophisticated
technology to gauge the risk embodied in a potential counterparty.
Non-dealer counterparties do not usually have the ability to gather and
analyze risk information on their counterparties, so they rely on the
implicit creditworthiness of dealing with a major banking institution.193
When OTC derivatives are cleared through a CCP, by contrast, the
ability and incentives of the parties to gauge credit risk differ in impor-
tant ways.  Here, the CCP is responsible for judging the credit risk of a
transaction.  A CCP is protected to some extent from “balance sheet”
risk by the fact that trading parties must be CMs; in ordinary circum-
stances it is also protected from “position risk” because it holds offset-
ting, mirror contracts for each trade.  But if a CM were to default, the
CCP functions as a mutual insurance scheme, and the other CMs will
collectively be on the hook for any losses.  Credit risk is priced indi-
rectly, by assessing the amount and riskiness of a CM’s positions and
then assessing initial and variation margin on its net positions.194
Because this assessment of credit risk is done indirectly, however, by
judging the risk of the particular trades, not the individual risk
presented by a particular CM, it is likely that the CCP will err on the
side of requiring too much collateral, in effect overcharging its more
creditworthy CMs for its services.  Such an overcharging may have a sig-
nificant cost on the market, in terms of suppressing otherwise beneficial
transactions.195
Because a CCP is unlikely to possess the ability to gauge the credit
risk of a particular transaction as accurately as a dealer bank can,196 a
significant informational asymmetry therefore exists in a centrally
cleared market that is absent in a bilaterally cleared one.197  Following
193. For a discussion of the “balance sheet” advantages the large derivative dealers
possess, see Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677. See also Awrey, supra note 37, at 265
(the role of derivative dealers as market makers).
194. See Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALY-
SIS NO. 665, July 21, 2010, at 9; Pirrong, supra note 30, at 18–19. See also supra note 159
and accompanying text.
195. See Duffie et al., supra note 46, at 9 (contrasting OTC and exchange trading).
196. But see Levitin, supra note 126, at 457 (“It is not clear that dealer banks’ risk
modeling will necessarily be superior to that of clearinghouses.”).
197. The difference between the competencies of the major derivative dealers and
the CCPs also forms an important plank of Gubler’s argument. See Gubler, supra note 62,
at 96–100.
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from this, because a dealer bank is likely to have better information, an
“adverse selection” problem arises.  A dealer bank will avoid trading in
derivatives it believes the CCP is overpricing in terms of collateral,
because these are too costly with respect to the likely payoff.  On the
other hand, where the CCP underprices the trade (i.e., requires less
collateral than the dealer’s own estimate tells it is prudent), the dealer
will intensively trade such contracts.198
The adverse selection problem exists on the level of specific trades.
Moving to the level of dealer banks as a whole, Pirrong sees an analo-
gous moral hazard problem.  Because a CCP ultimately takes on all bal-
ance sheet risk, i.e., the risk that a CM will default, individual CMs have
an incentive to act in a risky way, knowing that their fellow CMs will
ultimately be responsible for the losses in the event of default.199  Pir-
rong likens this to a “tragedy of the commons” type situation, where
each individual actor captures the benefits of risky activity while the
group as a whole bears the cost of its detrimental effects.200  Of course,
a CCP imposes margin and CM capital requirements in an attempt to
control the moral hazard implicit in the insurance mutualization
scheme, which in turn may lead to less trading and decreased effi-
ciency.  Informational asymmetries leading to inefficiencies and inap-
propriate incentives are the centerpiece of Pirrong’s criticism of the
CCP mandate.
b. Inefficiency of Multilateral Netting
Prominent among the other criticisms of CCP clearing is the fear
that the multilateral netting regime used in CCP clearing will not be as
efficient as the bilateral netting regime in the OTC market.201  With
bilateral netting, a counterparty (typically a dealer bank) can cancel out
duplicative exposures with a counterparty, thereby reducing the total
notional amount outstanding in its economic relationship with the
other party.  Most importantly, bilateral netting allows for reduction of
total notional amounts across product categories, i.e., for different
types of derivatives, as long as they are between the same two parties.
Imagine that Party A has purchased credit protection from Party B on
two separate reference obligations in amounts of $10 and $20 million
(denoted as CDS X and CDS Y, respectively).  Party A has also entered
into interest rate swaps with Party B on two other reference obligations
in the amounts of $10 and $15 million (denoted as IRS W and IRS Z,
respectively).  While the four contracts will vary in terms of the cost of
the protection in each one, based on the risk embodied in underlying
reference obligation as well as the counterparty risk, there is a net expo-
sure of $5 million here, the amount by which the total protection A has
purchased exceeds the total protection it has sold to B.  While the indi-
198. Yesha Yadav offers a variation on this argument. See Yadav, supra note 159, at
416–17.
199. See Pirrong, supra note 194, at 11.
200. Id. at 12. See also Johnson, supra note 140, arguing that financial markets are
like a “commons” that will benefit from a “community governance” model of regulation.
201. See Duffie & Zhu, supra note 50.
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vidual contracts will vary in terms of their underlying risks, with bilateral
netting the total gross amounts provide a beginning point for netting
out the total exposures.  This has important practical effects, as it
reduces the total amount of exposure of individual parties to one
another that must be settled in the event of a default, and by extension,
reduces total systemic risk in the financial system.
A B
$10 CDS X
$20 CDS Y
$10 IRS W
$15 IRS Z
Before Bilateral Netting
A B
$5 Net Exposure
After Bilateral Netting
In a CCP regime, by contrast, netting does not take place across
product category, but instead includes all counterparties with exposure
to the same class of derivatives, i.e., CDSs, interest rate swaps, or foreign
exchange swaps.  Multilateral netting eliminates duplicative exposure in
a “daisy chain” situation.  Assume that Party A purchases a CDS from
Party B on $10 million of GM bonds; Party B has hedged its exposure
on this trade by buying credit protection in turn on the same bonds for
the same amount from Party C.  Party C, however, has also hedged itself
by purchasing protection on the very same bonds from Party A.  While
this is a simple example, it illustrates how the net exposure on a particu-
lar risk can be zero, or at least relatively small compared to the total
amounts outstanding if the individual contracts are not netted out
against one another.  The fact that there can be substantial multilateral
netting opportunities for certain derivatives indicates the overlapping
nature of the derivatives dealers’ business, and shows that they make
money on the spreads of these contracts while simultaneously attempt-
ing to hedge their own exposure.
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Multilateral netting then is one of the prime objectives of a CCP
regime: total exposure in the system will be reduced by cancelling out
overlapping obligations on the same reference entities among CMs
exposed to them.  Duffie and Zhu identify three main benefits of multi-
lateral netting: 1) systemic risk can be reduced by lowering the likeli-
hood that defaults propagate from counterparty to counterparty, 2)
clearing can reduce the degree to which solvency problems of a market
participant are compounded by the flight of OTC derivatives
counterparties, and 3) multilateral netting can reduce the risk of dis-
ruptions to financial markets through fire sales of derivatives positions
or collateral held against them.202  They also conclude that given the
current amounts of CDS and other exposures in the derivatives mar-
kets, it is unlikely the benefits from multilateral clearing will outweigh
the benefits from bilateral clearing in a bilateral market.203  For multi-
lateral clearing through a CCP to be beneficial, the “introduction of a
CCP for a particular class such as standard credit derivatives is effective
if and only if the opportunity for multilateral netting in that class domi-
nates the resulting loss in bilateral netting opportunities across all
uncleared derivatives, such as uncleared CDS and uncleared OTC
derivatives of equities, interest rates, commodities, and foreign
exchange, among others.”204  The model of CCP clearing efficiency
Duffie and Zhu construct implies that “clearing CDS through a dedi-
cated CCP improves netting efficiency for twelve similar sized dealers if
and only if the fraction of a typical dealer’s total expected exposure
attributable to cleared CDS is at least 66% of the total expected expo-
202. Duffie & Zhu, supra note 50, at 2.
203. Duffie & Zhu point out that bilateral netting across six asset classes in data
provided by the Bank of International Settlements reduced total gross exposures in OTC
derivatives from $24.7 trillion to $3.6 trillion in data for June 2010. Id. at 14. But see
Rama Cont & Thomas Kokholm, Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives: Bilateral Vs. Multilateral
Netting, 31 STAT. & RISK MODELING 3 (2014) (finding that Duffie & Zhu’s conclusion is
highly sensitive to assumptions).
204. Duffie & Zhu, supra note 50, at 3.
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sure” of the remaining bilaterally netted derivatives.205  They believe it
is unlikely that would be the case.  Even if the group of dealers were
expanded to twenty-six, it would still require that the typical dealer’s
total exposure attributable to cleared CDSs be 41.7%.206  Since the five
largest derivatives dealers account for 95% of the total notional credit
derivatives positions of U.S. banks, it is all the more unlikely that the
benefits of multilateral netting will exceed those of bilateral netting.207
c. Loss Shifting, Not Loss Reduction
A third objection to CCP clearing is that in the event of a failure of
a CM, the losses incurred are not reduced but merely shifted, and in a
possibly unfair manner: from the failing institution’s derivatives
counterparties it trades with through the CCP to its other creditors.
Both Mark Roe and Craig Pirrong highlight this shortcoming.208  In
bilaterally cleared derivatives markets, should a market participant fail,
its counterparties will suffer losses on the gross positions of their profit-
able contracts; in CCP-cleared markets, by contrast, they will only suffer
net losses on their positions.  Assume that Dealer A has three contracts:
Derivatives Contract 1, where it owes Party B $100, Derivatives Contract
2, where Party C owes it $100 and Loan 1, where it owes Bank D $100.
Dealer A’s total obligations here are $200, and its assets $100.  In the
event of Dealer A’s failure without CCP clearing, it will have a $100
asset to split between Party B and Bank D.  Assume CCP clearing, how-
ever, and Bank D suffers a total loss: because Derivatives Contract 1 and
Derivatives Contract 2 are netted out against one another, Party B will
suffer a loss of zero here, while Bank D will be forced to bear the loss of
its entire $100 loan.
This simple example demonstrates that CCP clearing protects
derivatives counterparties at the expense of non-derivatives counterpar-
ties.  As a result, both Roe and Pirrong argue that a CCP does not elimi-
nate the market risk of a transaction, it just shifts it to parties other than
the derivatives counterparties at that CCP that the failing institution
carries out business with.
d. Inefficiency Due to Reduction in “Bespoke” Trades
A fourth potential disadvantage to CCP clearing is that if regulators
institute rigorous clearing requirements under new Exchange Act Sec-
tion 3C(a),209 i.e., are sparing in their allowance of exemptions, many
otherwise economically beneficial trades will be discouraged or even
prohibited.  Many derivatives are “bespoke,” with specific terms that
parties use to tailor a derivative to the particular risk one is trying to
205. Id. at 4; see also id. at 13–14.
206. Id. at 11.
207. Id. at 16–17.
208. See Roe, supra note 172; Pirrong, supra note 125, at 47.  This objection to multi-
lateral netting forms the core of Roe’s The Dodd-Frank Act’s Maginot Line, supra note 62.
But see Levitin’s rejoinder that this is only a problem of risk transfer, not risk generation.
Levitin, supra note 126, at 465.
209. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
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hedge.  It is unclear how significant this problem will be in practice, as
the end-user exemption will allow non-financial companies hedging
business risks to sidestep the clearing requirement,210 but requiring
standardization of terms will be a challenge for many derivatives.211
For example, the CDSs on CDOs that brought AIG to the brink of fail-
ure are sufficiently customized that they would presumably be exempt
from the Dodd-Frank clearing mandate.212  Regulators could make a
decision not to allow trading in such instruments, but this would have
the effect of “playing God” with the financial markets and, critics argue,
stifling financial innovation and restricting arguably beneficial
transactions.213
e. Unintended Consequences of Collateral Requirements
In an attempt to reduce the risk of derivatives trades, Title VII man-
dates collateral requirements for both cleared and exempted trades in
new Exchange Act Section 15F(e).214  While dealers in the bilateral
markets usually demand collateral of their counterparties, they for-
merly had discretion over whether and how much collateral to demand.
Collateral requirements under the CCP regime are expected to
increase, and uncleared trades exempted from the clearing require-
ment will now require collateral.215  While collateral can be thought of
as a good thing, as a sort of insurance on a trade, Craig Pirrong points
out the far-reaching unintended consequences that could result.216
The end result of the collateral requirements is, in Pirrong’s view, the
increased exposure of the banking system to the derivatives markets.217
First, under the new rules the amount of collateral required of
counterparties is likely to increase.  This increase will result in increased
demand for high-quality assets to be used as collateral posted with the
CCPs.  “Collateral transformation” services are already in operation in
order to meet this demand, essentially engaging in a form of “repo”
(repurchase) agreements to supply parties with the grade of collateral
required by CCPs, secured by lesser quality assets such as junk bonds or
other more speculative securities.218  These transformation services cre-
ate another set of nodes of connection in an already complex financial
system.  According to Pirrong, demand for collateral will create more
demand for AAA assets such as the types of structured finance securities
210. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
211. See Stulz, supra note 30, at 88–89. Cf. Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677
(pointing out that the bulk of CDSs are standardized CDS on corporate names and are
appropriate for CCP clearing).
212. See Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677.
213. Duffie et al., supra note 46, at 9–10.
214. Dodd-Frank Act § 764; 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e) (2012). See also Margin and Capital
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27564 (May 11, 2011).
215. Dodd-Frank § 764; 15 U.S.C. 78o-10(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
216. See Craig Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Liquidity Trap?, 24 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 67 (2012). See also Pirrong, supra note 175, at 12–15.
217. Id. at 73.
218. See Security Services: The Rising Demand for Collateral Spells a Moneymaking Opportu-
nity, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 2012, at 74.
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that were integral to the crash of 2008.219  Second, the collateral
requirements will increase procyclicality in the financial markets, as
CCPs will demand more collateral in times of stress, often using vari-
ance at risk or “VaR” models to justify increased amounts of collateral
in times of financial stress.220  All this has the effect of leading to
increased rigidity in the financial system and, ultimately, greater expo-
sure of the banking system to events in the derivatives markets.  Conse-
quently, Pirrong sees the unintended consequences of the new
collateral requirements as likely contributing to increased systemic risk
in the financial system, rather than reducing it.
f. Regulatory Infeasibility
An important line of criticism of Dodd-Frank offered by legal
scholars, and echoed by Pirrong, is that the regulatory authorities are
not up to the task of implementing the regulatory oversight required by
Dodd-Frank, and by extension, of policing the derivatives markets.  Kris-
tin Johnson offers the fullest exposition of this criticism, though Dan
Awrey and Zachary Gubler voice it as well.221
This argument stems first of all from the incredible complexity of
the markets and the risks embodied in particular derivatives trades.
Because of this complexity, the main derivatives dealers invest millions
of dollars in employees with advanced quantitative and information
technology skills in an attempt to accurately understand the risks their
traders confront in the markets; these privately-funded efforts result in
proprietary knowledge and software which only exist because the deal-
ers have the exclusive opportunity to profit from their investments.222
Government agencies, on the other hand, will not have the budgets to
fund such knowledge that could be used to understand the markets
they are charged with regulating.  Perhaps more importantly, neither
may the CCPs.  Because of this gap between what Dodd-Frank requires
of regulators and their indirect agents in the markets, the CCPs, and
what financial markets participants know about the markets, the regula-
tory structure of Title VII is open to serious criticism that it requires a
regulatory structure that is unworkable in practice.
Given these considerations, Johnson advocates a self-regulatory
organization or “SRO” to govern derivatives markets.  Drawing on the
“commons” literature stemming from Garrett Hardin’s work, she
believes a SRO will likely be far more successful than the top-down, reg-
219. See Pirrong, supra note 216, at 69.
220. Id. at 70.
221. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 220-21; 234-42; Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC
Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide, 11 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 155,
185-87 (2010); Gubler, supra note 62 (proposing collaborative regulatory structures as an
alternative to both “top down” and “bottom up” alternatives). See also Colleen Baker,
Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287,
1318–22 (2010) (reviewing the challenges any regulatory effort concerning derivatives
faces).
222. See Pirrong, supra note 194, at 15; Awrey, supra note 221, at 186.
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ulatory model embodied in Dodd-Frank.223  In particular, she believes
that a SRO acting under community governance principles would be
far more successful in determining which derivatives are eligible for
exemption from the clearing requirement and the margin and collat-
eral requirements for such transactions.224  Zachary Gubler presents a
related argument, drawing on the new institutional economics litera-
ture to argue that markets are not an efficient substitute for banks in
the derivatives markets, and therefore a regulatory approach focused
on CCPs (which function as a market substitute) is unlikely to be suc-
cessful.225  Finally, the superior ability of individual market participants
to deal with informational challenges in the derivatives markets is a
lynchpin of Pirrong’s approach, which sees potential inefficiencies, and
even more dangerously, the creation of moral hazard as resulting from
the practical inability CCPs will have in matching sophisticated
counterparties in the race for accurate knowledge about the risks
embodied in derivatives transactions.226
g. Creation of a “Too Interconnected to Fail” Entity
Finally, the CCP mandate runs the risk of creating one or multiple
“Too Big to Fail,” or perhaps more accurately, “Too Interconnected to
Fail,” entities.  Commentators have focused on this paradox of the new
derivatives regulation, which is heightened by the fact that the fewer
CCPs there are, the greater benefits that can be expected to result.227
Since a CCP will be a central node in the financial system, its failure
could have the effect that was feared if AIG had collapsed.228  The urge
to backstop such an institution in the event of a market crisis would be
considerable, and governments could then be faced with the ultimate
“TBTF” entity.
2. Philosophical Characteristics of the Arguments Against
The arguments above combine to present a forceful case against
the clearing mandate and other new requirements of Title VII.  This
Article of course argues in favor of Title VII, though I believe that the
new regulations can only be justified by simultaneously emphasizing the
uncertainty inherent in our attempts to understand the workings of the
contemporary financial system as well as the broader framework for
financial regulation presented in Part IV.  Before we reach that point, it
is important to ask if there is any philosophic framework implicit in the
arguments of the opponents of central clearing.  I believe the argu-
223. Johnson, supra note 140, at 178–79 (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968)). See also Pirrong, supra note 194, at 12 (using the concept
of the tragedy of the commons in The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates).
224. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 252.
225. See Gubler, supra note 62.
226. See Pirrong, supra note 194.
227. See generally Duffie & Zhu, supra note 50. See also Baker, supra note 221, at
1355; Pirrong, supra note 177, at 14–15.
228. As Chander & Costa point out, derivative dealers really function as “de facto
unregulated central clearing counterparties . . . .”  Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677.
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ments against central clearing reflect three key aspects of the dominant
mode of economic argument over the past half century: scientism, Pan-
glossianism, and utilitarianism.  It is important to contrast these with
the epistemological tolerance, pragmatism, and holism required by the
argument for Title VII reviewed above in Part III.A.2.
a. Scientism
Pirrong is honest about the inherent difficulty of attaining certain,
formalizable and quantifiable knowledge of the contemporary deriva-
tives trading markets at the same time that he illustrates a commitment
to the traditional goals and methods of mainstream financial econom-
ics.  He acknowledges our epistemological limitations, conceding that it
is very difficult to come to quantifiable measures of the various factors
at play in making an empirical evaluation as to the desirability of clear-
ing, while downplaying the likely beneficial second-order, behavioral
effects of a CCP regime that form the crux of the argument for
clearing.
The dominant methodological trend in economics, including
financial economics, over the past fifty years has been to model eco-
nomics on the “hard” sciences, preeminently physics.229  Were this
quest successful, it would result in a science of economics that had at its
core testable propositions yielding empirically verifiable statements.
Where possible, such propositions would be formally expressed in
mathematical language, which provides the framework for quantitative
analysis of economic systems and effects.  Pirrong acknowledges the dif-
ficulty in reaching this standard with a system as complex as the deriva-
tives trading markets when he states:
The nature of this analysis is inherently qualitative.  It is difficult
for anyone, be they academics, market participants or regulators,
to determine definitively whether a clearinghouse would improve
the efficiency of the CDS market.  I certainly do not claim to pos-
sess such definitive knowledge.230
That said, Pirrong still hews to scientific goals of mainstream finan-
cial economics.  In his most extensive analysis, The Economics of Clearing
in Derivatives Markets, he constructs formal models to illustrate the
default risk posed by financial intermediaries as well as the equilibrium
effects of clearing.231  More importantly, he downplays the prophylactic
psychological effect that a CCP may have on the market.
Pirrong’s understanding of CCP clearing appears to demonstrate a
commitment to the understanding of economic agents as rational
actors that is a cornerstone of mainstream economics.232  In particular,
Pirrong downplays the effects that a CCP may have on forestalling runs
229. See Andrew W. Lo & Mark T. Mueller, Physics Envy May Be Hazardous to Your
Wealth 3–7, (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563882.
230. Pirrong, supra note 125, at 45.
231. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 8–14, 66–73.
232. See Daniel McFadden, Rationality for Economists?, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73
(1999).
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on a CM.  The implication of Professor Scott’s Interconnectedness and
Contagion is that since interconnectedness did not play a significant role
in the downfall of Lehman Brothers, derivatives trading and the institu-
tion of CCPs should not be the focus of financial reforms.  Neverthe-
less, Professor Scott does not go quite this far; despite the clear
implication of his results, he adopts an agnostic position on CCPs, cit-
ing the research of Duffie and others.233  Pirrong however ignores any
possible beneficial ‘behavioral’ effect CCPs may play in this way, instead
focusing on other second-order effects of a clearing mandate such as
the unintended consequences of clearing mandates and exacerbation
of information asymmetries.234  Note however that if parties prior to
the downfall of Lehman Brothers were in fact motivated by a general,
nonspecific fear that included uncertainty over the effects of derivatives
exposures and interconnection, for one to conclude that in the future
such concerns would not play an important role seems to require of the
rationality of market participants that they learn from their mistakes
and not repeat them again in the future.
It is important not to exaggerate Pirrong’s scientism, however.
Part of the persuasiveness of his work is his deep understanding of the
institutional mechanics of the derivatives markets, and his acknowledge-
ment of the difficulty of coming to definitive conclusions about a system
as complex as this.  Nevertheless, his views bear the imprint of an
emphasis on the rationality of market participants and a neglect of
purely behavioral explanations for important elements of the financial
crisis and the concomitant prophylactic effects central clearing may
have.
b. Panglossianism
Pirrong’s arguments also betray a “Panglossian” character some-
times observed in economic arguments: the notion that if something
were actually beneficial, i.e. promoted efficiency, market actors would
have already created it.235  By extension, what is seen in the markets
independent of government regulation (insofar as this can be identi-
fied) must be the “best of all possible worlds,” or at least efficient.  In
his writings against the CCP mandate, Pirrong argues that if a CCP
regime were beneficial, market participants would have developed one
already for their derivatives activities; the fact that they haven’t implies
233. See Scott, supra note 96, at 99–104.
234. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 43–53. See also Pirrong, supra note 175, at 11–12.
For Pirrong’s analysis of Scott’s Interconnectedness and Contagion, see his blog post at Street-
wise Professor, Nov. 21, 2012, http://streetwiseprofessor.com.
235. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE OR OPTIMISM 114 (Norman L. Torrey ed., 1946) (“All is for
the best in this best of all possible worlds.”).  For discussion of the “Panglossian argu-
ment” in law and economics scholarship, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. F. 833, 888–90 (2005).  For an interesting discussion
of Panglossianism in economics, see James A. Yunker, Panglossian Tendencies in Economics:
The Case of Theoretical Welfare Economics, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 759, 762 (2009) (arguing that
“in the real world, there are many Pareto-inefficient equilibria that are nevertheless social
welfare superior to other Pareto-efficient equilibria.”).
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that it is inappropriate in this context.236  This ignores the possibility
the markets could be stuck in a position of sub-optimal equilibrium,
where a certain few parties benefit, while less powerful market partici-
pants, and perhaps society as a whole, suffer.237  In this type of market
failure, government regulation may be necessary to bring the market to
a more optimal point.  Just as state automobile insurance laws are nec-
essary to force many individuals to purchase insurance who would oth-
erwise drive uninsured, a government CCP mandate may play a
legitimate role in mandating that market participants pay the insurance
cost of becoming a clearing member of a CCP, since the effects of trad-
ing without such insurance can be so disastrous.  The assumption that if
something were beneficial it would have been developed already
ignores the possibility that markets can get stuck in a less than optimal
equilibrium, as is likely the case with the “derivative dealers club.”
(This line of argument also implicitly downplays the risks, and effects,
of market failure.)
While not “Panglossian” in this sense, the criticisms of the regula-
tory structure of Dodd-Frank offered by Gubler, Johnson, and Baker
display another sort of optimism, optimism in the ability of market
actors to police themselves.238  While there are significant reasons to
doubt that government regulators will be able to perform this job them-
selves, primarily due to resource limitations, a “community governance”
model operating as a self-regulatory organization or “SRO” that
requires market participants to be actively involved in determining the
standards to apply in these markets ought also to be viewed skeptically
after the failures of 2008.239  Even as strong a believer in free markets as
236. Pirrong, supra note 125, at 44 (The advantages of clearinghouses “cannot be
gainsaid, but the testimonials beg an important question: If the benefits of centralized
clearing are so great, why haven’t CDS market participants embraced the concept before
now, and then only under regulatory pressure?”).  To be fair, Pirrong himself is aware of
the Panglossian critique. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 65 (“Some may find this analysis
Panglossian, in that it suggests that the existing methods for sharing default risks in the
OTC markets are the optimal ones.  I would respond by saying that at the very least, one
must give some deference to the survivorship principle.”).
237. See generally Litan, supra note 22 (arguing that the major derivatives dealers
benefit from with bilateral trading at the expense of their customers); Awrey, supra note
37, at 265 (complexity in new financial markets has “often been used by intermediaries as
a group to prevent the commoditization of many financial innovations, ultimately forestall-
ing the redistribution of rents from innovators to consumers which one might otherwise
expect to take place over time.”); Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677 (“If CCPs provide
such numerous benefits, why have the private derivatives markets not moved to them
absent government pressure?  As already indicated, dealers have incentives to prefer the
status quo.”); Levitin, supra note 126, at 450 n.15 (“The private dealer benefits from opac-
ity in the OTC markets may answer Professor Craig Pirrong’s question of why centralized
clearing did not emerge on its own for credit derivatives; dealers did not want to give up
the spread.”).
238. Johnson proposes a “community governance” model for an SRO to govern
CDS trading. See Johnson, supra note 140, at 242–56.  Gubler’s work draws on the new
institutional economics to propose a “new governance” model. See Gubler, supra note 62,
at 112–18.  Baker proposes a “public-private partnership” on the international level. See
Baker, supra note 221, at 1369–76.
239. Cf. Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009) (finding that public enforcement of
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Alan Greenspan famously acknowledged that he had been wrong in
assuming that financial market participants possessed the proper incen-
tives to police themselves in the years leading up to 2008.240  The inter-
nal structure of the massive banks that dominate the derivatives
markets, and the incentives individual traders and managers have
inside these institutions, offer reasons to be skeptical of the notion that
the banks will act in ways that further the interest of the institution as a
whole, as opposed to the interest of a particular individual within it.  If
the actions of these banks in individual cases are not tethered to their
own medium and long-term health, it is difficult to have faith that they
can be prompted, through a SRO-type organization, to act for the good
of the financial markets as a whole.
c. Utilitarianism
As with the scientism discussed above, the arguments against CCP
clearing bear the implicit stamp of the utilitarianism that is a non-neces-
sary but common feature of economic argument.  Evidence of this is
found not only in the manner in which alternative economic arrange-
ments are evaluated, the cost-benefit analysis, but also in the specific
content of the measure of benefit: social welfare.  The definition of
social welfare is essential, as what is ordinarily taken into account in
making a cost-benefit analysis contributes to the goal of elevating eco-
nomic analysis to the status of a science.  At the same time, it exposes
this analysis to criticism that it ignores very important societal values
that intersect with an economic system, as will be explored further in
Part IV.
Utilitarianism is the default philosophic worldview of much eco-
nomic analysis.241  Economics may not necessarily be utilitarian, as
Judge Posner argues,242 but both history and methodology align the
two.243  Not only did economics develop alongside utilitarianism in
nineteenth century England, but the founders of utilitarianism, Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, both made important contributions to
economics.  On a deeper level, utilitarianism’s “Greatest Happiness
Principle” or “Proportionality Doctrine” points towards the quantita-
tive.  John Stuart Mill states “that actions are right in proportion as they
financial markets law is positively associated with deeper capital markets than private
enforcement).
240. Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan ‘Shocked’ that Free Markets
Are Flawed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/
worldbusiness/23iht-gspan.4.17206624.html (quoting Alan Greenspan, who stated that
he “made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks
and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders
and their equity in the firms.”).
241. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’ Theory of Justice,
70(9) J. PHILOS. 246 (1979) (“The implicit ethical basis of economic policy judgment is
some version of utilitarianism.”).
242. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979).
243. See Russell J. Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1987 (1996).
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tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness.  By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.”244  Since
making any particular moral judgment requires tallying pleasures and
pains, this conception of the good is intrinsically quantitative, as the
best state of affairs or path of action is conceived of as the one contain-
ing the greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain.
The Greatest Happiness Principle has its obvious analog in the
cost-benefit analysis of welfare economics and public policy, where the
economic cost of various alternatives or proposals are computed, with
the one resulting in the least total cost being deemed the best or most
desirable.  Implicit in both utilitarianism and the cost-benefit analysis is
the assumption that there is one single standard of value by which all
aspects of alternative arrangements can be measured.245  Also impor-
tant for the connection between utilitarianism and economics is the
concept of “social welfare.”  Dan Awrey sets forth the concept of social
welfare as used in welfare economics as the appropriate standard for
evaluation of regulation in the financial sphere.246  Social welfare is
defined as “a function of the aggregate well-being (or utility) of the
members of a society.”247  While this utility can include anything an
individual values, such as material items, aesthetic or altruistic experi-
ence, or even abstract values such as morality, fairness and justice,
Awrey explains that social welfare analyses usually exclude abstract and
subjective concepts such as fairness due to the inherent difficulty of
using such “amorphous” notions.248  Even if social welfare were defined
to include the utility of abstract and philosophical values to individuals,
though, it would still be fundamentally utilitarian, as it attempts to
assign some determinate measure of worth to those concepts in relation
to individuals in society.
Pirrong’s criticism of CCP clearing uses a cost-benefit analysis with
the concept of social welfare as an evaluative standard.  Section 8 of The
Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets offers a cost-benefit analysis of
default risk sharing in bilateral markets versus that of central clearing.
Pirrong focuses on the costs of monitoring and pricing balance sheet
risks, as well as the costs of risk assessment of complex derivatives, work-
ing through various factors which are likely to increase or decrease
costs in each alternative.  He concludes that “sharing default risks as is
244. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL 203, 210 (John M. Robson ed., 1969).
245. For a discussion of the significance of a single standard, see Richard A.
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
683.
246. See Awrey, supra note 221, at 165–70 (Section 3, “Regulating OTC Derivatives:
An Evaluative Framework”).
247. Id. at 166 n.51.
248. Id.  Awrey also states that “the regulation of OTC derivatives arguably does not
engage any pressing moral, social, cultural or other imperatives which might be thought
to reside outside the evaluative scope of economic theory.” Id. at 167.  This Article argues
otherwise, although those within the conventional evaluative scope of economic theory
are the focus.
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done on bilateral OTC markets offers certain efficiency advantages over
centralized default risk sharing” where complex derivatives are traded
by opaque firms with complex balance sheets.249  Thus, he offers a stan-
dard cost-benefit analysis where costs and benefits are tallied on behalf
of each alternative and the alternative with the least total cost, i.e., the
most efficient, is deemed superior.250  Section 9, “Systemic Risk,” sets
these alternatives in the context of the larger issue of derivatives trading
and systemic risk.  Again, Pirrong tallies what he sees as the likely costs
and benefits of each system; while central clearing can reduce losses
from dealer default, because replacement costs are reduced when par-
ties net their exposures, there are also significant costs, including the
costs of redistributing losses from CMs to non-CMs, the effects on trad-
ing activity of misplaced incentives, mispricing of risk and the effects of
the formation of a CCP on incentives of counterparties to monitor
dealers.
The standard Pirrong uses to compare bilateral and CCP clearing
regimes is efficiency, i.e., the greatest output of the system for a given
amount of inputs.251  He also uses the term “social welfare,” again
appearing to indicate the total economic output of the economic sys-
tem in question.252  Efficiency and social welfare have a utilitarian cast
to them, as they imply that the standard for evaluation of various alter-
natives is the one that produces the greatest amount of economic out-
put for the least possible cost.  While Pirrong’s approach is not at all
unusual, it is important to note that the wider and more diffuse effects
of the economic crisis do not fall within the categories of costs and
benefits enumerated by Pirrong.253  Both tangible costs such as the loss
in home equity values and the costs of the foreclosure crisis, as well as
the more subjective, psychological costs of the personal misery caused
by extended, elevated unemployment levels due to the recession, are
not included in either his cost-benefit analyses or even his definition of
social welfare.254  While the causal connection between these societal
traumas and derivatives trading is complex and clouded by uncertainty,
they are very real phenomena that are connected to derivatives trading,
and this analysis neglects them.  The standard economic analysis
achieves a certain measure of precision by limiting itself to tangible
249. Pirrong, supra note 30, at 51.
250. For another cost-benefit analysis of clearing, see Gubler, supra note 62, at
14–17; see also Awrey, supra note 221.
251. See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 194, at 14 (in discussing the costs of requiring CMs
to back up one another’s trades, “the formation of a clearinghouse may not be efficient if
the benefits of fungibility, net of its costs, are lower than the net benefits of alternative
means for trading of derivatives and sharing default risks.”)
252. Pirrong, supra note 30, at 21.
253. For an example of a broader consideration of such costs, see ADMATI &
HELLWIG, supra note 12, at 82 (“When bankers complain that banking regulation is expen-
sive, they typically do not take into account the costs of their harming the rest of the
financial system and the overall economy with the risks they take.  Public policy, however,
must consider all the costs and not simply those to the bankers.”).
254. See Edward M. Gramlich, Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Chal-
lenges (Remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting,
Chicago, Illinois, May 21, 2004).
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items within the derivatives trading system itself, but this precision
comes at the expense of ignoring the more general and diffuse effects
of the financial system on society at large.
The defense and criticism of Title VII each betray certain philo-
sophical tendencies—a tolerance for uncertainty, a pragmatic stance,
and the use of regulation to accomplish goals extrinsic to the deriva-
tives trading regime itself, on the one hand, versus a certain measure of
scientism found in standard economic analysis, as well as Panglossian-
ism and utilitarianism.  It is important to remember, however, that the
debate reviewed above in Part III is ultimately an empirical one: to what
extent does the evidence suggest that CCP clearing reduces systemic
risk?  As we have seen, there are arguments on both sides and the ques-
tion is at this point unresolved.  Furthermore, important commentators
such as Duffie and Scott, who are skeptical of clearing in some respects,
appear to shrink back from Pirrong’s full-throated skepticism.  This
unresolved debate is the point of departure for Part IV.
IV. RAWLSIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG
DERIVATIVES REGULATION
Given that the relatively strong derivatives provisions of Dodd-
Frank Title VII were enacted, legislators and regulators chose not to
listen to the warnings of critics but instead embraced the path espoused
by CFTC Chair Gary Gensler and other reform-minded advocates.  As
with Dodd-Frank in general, enactment of a regulatory scheme with
detailed requirements for financial institutions to follow and a large
role for government agencies charged with oversight runs counter to
the deregulatory trend that has prevailed in many areas of the Ameri-
can regulatory state since the late 1970s.  Obviously, such a turn was
supported by public anger over the financial crisis and the attendant
bailouts, as well as Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress.
The question I will address in Part IV, however, is not only political
but philosophical: what philosophical perspective best explains, and
even more importantly, justifies the strong derivatives regulation in
Dodd-Frank?  Pirrong’s argument against CCP clearing reviewed above
in Part III uses the standard concept of social welfare, with the aggre-
gate utility directly produced by a system as its evaluative measure.  This
measure fails to take into account costs or benefits incurred by parties
indirectly connected to the system of derivatives trading (e.g., the real
estate losses suffered by homeowners who bought at the crest of a bub-
ble market inflated by real estate investment through structured
finance securities, which were reliant on CDSs), and once we do move
outside those narrow confines, the factors involved are probably too
complex and multifarious to reach any definitive answer for or against
CCP trading.  (A utilitarian argument for CCP clearing, that the inter-
ests of millions of individuals affected by financial crises, caused in large
part by a highly interconnected financial system, amounts to a massive
quantity of benefit obtaining in a financial system that values safety
above all else, is likewise confronted with the difficulty of accurately
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enumerating, let alone measuring, all the possible effects and linkages
and interests of individuals.)  As a result, on empirical grounds alone,
there is too much uncertainty to come to a definitive answer for or
against CCP trading.  Utilitarianism, and the scientific perspective that
financial economics aims for, neither clearly supports nor militates
against the Dodd-Frank derivatives provisions; the utilitarian argument
against them relies on the narrow ambit offered by Pirrong, where
“social welfare” is understood as the efficiency of the derivatives trading
system itself, thereby neglecting important second-order effects of
derivatives in the financial system.
On utilitarian grounds, then, there is no clear answer to the ques-
tion of whether Dodd-Frank’s reforms should be beneficial.  In this con-
text of fundamental uncertainty, however, Rawlsian political theory
offers a much different analysis, which moreover supports the regula-
tions, with important caveats.  My central argument is that Rawls offers
a particularly valuable lens through which the project of regulating
derivatives ought to be understood, particularly in its approach to deci-
sion-making under conditions of extreme uncertainty, but also in its
emphasis on democratic equality and its conception of markets as fun-
damentally constituted by rules.  Rawlsian theory is a comprehensive
philosophic platform from which to respond to the objections of Pir-
rong and others, and one that provides an alternative to the scientism,
Panglossianism, and utilitarianism evident in the lines of argument
offered by the critics of Title VII.  Most importantly, the Rawlsian per-
spective does not demand certainty concerning what happened or what
the exact effects of the new rules will be, but instead justifies govern-
mental action in the face of substantial uncertainty.
A. Basic Planks of Rawls’s Political Theory Applicable to
Financial Regulation
John Rawls’s central achievement is a theory of justice offering a
strong alternative to the utilitarian theories dominant in nineteenth
and twentieth century thought.  In formulating his theory, Rawls draws
extensively on the thought of Immanuel Kant, as well as that of the
other social contract theorists.255  Kant’s categorical imperative, the
“universal form of law as such,” can be used as an algorithm of sorts to
test the moral status of possible plans of action, and is therefore an
alternative to the utilitarian practice of relying on what are essentially
cost-benefit analyses in making moral judgments.  Rawls was attracted to
Kantian deontology because he believed that utilitarianism failed to
explain the institutions of constitutional democracy;256 he also saw that
the utilitarian doctrine that we “are to arrange institutions so as to
obtain the greatest sum of satisfactions” leads to problems such as the
255. For an overview of Rawls’s thought, including its relation to the thought of not
only Kant but Locke, Rousseau, and others, see Samuel Freeman, Introduction: John Rawls
— An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
256. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at xi–xii (Revised ed. 1999).
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necessity of weighting the satisfaction of desires that harm others.257
Rawls’s vision of “justice as fairness” avoids these problems by prioritiz-
ing the right over the good and adopting a principled position concern-
ing what desires ought to be counted as legitimate.258  Since
mainstream economics is deeply bound up with utilitarian modes of
thought, Rawls is especially important for a response to standard eco-
nomic arguments that presume a utilitarian framework.  Indeed, Rawls
himself devoted considerable attention to economics in A Theory of Jus-
tice and elsewhere.
1. Foundational Principles
Rawls begins A Theory of Justice with the following thought experi-
ment, that of a person in the “Original Position”: Imagine you could
choose the fundamental characteristics of the social world you would be
born into, while at the same time your particular circumstances in that
world, such as your family, class, race, and even personal talents were
hidden from you behind a “veil of ignorance.”259  In this position of
extreme uncertainty, what would you choose as the fundamental gov-
erning principles of your social world?  Rawls believes that a person in
this hypothetical Original Position would choose a world governed by
two fundamental principles, which he terms the “two principles of
justice”:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme
of liberties for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to
all.260
The first principle secures the basic liberties, such as political lib-
erty (including the right to vote and to hold public office), freedom of
speech and liberty of conscience, the right to hold private property and
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, while the second concerns
the distribution of various goods in society.  This scheme requires
“serial” or “lexical” ordering,261 so that political rights cannot be
exchanged or comprised for the sake of economic and social gains.262
The second principle, the “difference principle,” concerns ques-
tions of the proper arrangement of the economy and the institutions
which determine the distribution of goods in society, e.g., wealth and
positions of authority.  In particular, Rawls believes that in the Original
Position a person would choose a world in which inequalities of wealth
are ultimately to everyone’s advantage, or, put another way, which
257. Id. at 27.
258. Id. at 28.
259. Id. at 10–11.
260. Id. at 53.
261. Id. at 37–38.
262. Id. at 55.
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“result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the
least advantaged members of society.”263  Rawls does not believe these
principles of justice mandate a particular form of the economy, though,
and various capitalist and socialist systems alike are compatible with the
two basic principles of justice.264  The test of whether a possible eco-
nomic system containing an inequality is acceptable is “that it must be
reasonable for each relevant representative man defined by this struc-
ture, when he views it as a going concern, to prefer his prospects with
the inequality to his prospects without it.”265  For example, a property-
owning democracy could entail members of the entrepreneurial class
starting out with better prospects than those who begin as unskilled
laborers.266  Such a system would be justified if “the greater expecta-
tions allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to do things which
raise the prospects of [the] laboring class.”267  If the system without
such an inequality would make the representative unskilled worker
even worse off than otherwise, so that he would choose this system con-
taining an inequality, the inequality would be justified.  As will be dis-
cussed below, the question this raises for a Rawlsian analysis of the
financial system is whether the present system with its gross inequalities
in fact raises the prospects of the various classes in society.
The two principles of justice together can be thought of as the
“maximin solution to the problem of social justice.”268  Under the
“maximin rule” we are to maximize the benefits flowing to the least-
advantaged individuals in the social structure.  Key to the application of
Rawls to the question of financial regulation is that the maximin solu-
tion is deeply bound up with decision-making under conditions of fun-
damental uncertainty.  Rawls believes that application of the maximin
rule is appropriate in situations marked by three conditions: 1) knowl-
edge of the likelihood (probability) of various possible outcomes “is
impossible, or at best extremely insecure”; 2) extreme risk aversion: the
person making the decision is not nearly as concerned with taking a
chance for additional advantage as with the risk of “losing much that is
important to him”; and 3) the situation involves grave risks, where the
alternatives to be avoided “have outcomes that one can hardly
accept.”269  Rawls recognizes that in most ordinary instances of choice
under uncertainty these conditions are lacking; his argument is that the
maximin rule is appropriate where these three conditions obtain, and
that they are present to a high degree in the original position.270 In
Part IV.B below I will argue that the legislators and regulators charged
with responding to the financial crisis were presented with a similar sit-
263. Id. at 13.
264. Id. at 57 (“I assume in all interpretations that the first principle of equal liberty
is satisfied and that the economy is roughly a free market system, although the means of
production may or may not be privately owned.”).
265. Id. at 56.
266. Id. at 67.
267. Id. at 68.
268. Id. at 132.
269. Id. at 134.
270. Id. at 135.
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uation, and due to the extreme risks that emanate from the financial
system, the question of how best to regulate derivatives trading ought
also to be seen as one where the maximin rule applies.
Next, the just world that will be chosen through the use of the
maximin rule has a complex relation to economic efficiency.  Accord-
ing to Rawls, justice is prior to efficiency.271  Whereas for utilitarians
efficiency is generally desirable as it increases the sum of total goods
available for consumption, for Rawls efficiency comports with justice
only if it benefits the representative individual from the least-
advantaged class.  There may be a variety of efficient economic arrange-
ments, some of which meet the requirements of the difference princi-
ple and some of which do not, and we must draw on the principles of
justice to determine which among them is best;272 “the principle of effi-
ciency cannot serve alone as a conception of justice.”273  As a result,
there may be changes required to an unjust economic system that lower
the expectations of certain classes, so it is not the case that “only
changes which improve everyone’s prospects are allowed.  Justice is
prior to efficiency and requires some changes that are not efficient in
this sense.”274  And while within the class of just arrangements the best
arrangement of a social system will be Pareto-efficient from the perspec-
tive of the representative individual of the least-advantaged class, i.e., it
will be impossible to change the existing arrangement in such a way
that would improve his or her expectations, Rawls argues that less effi-
cient arrangements can still be just, even though they are not ideal.275
This consequence of the difference principle has great importance for
questions of financial regulation from a Rawlsian point of view.
Last but not least, Rawls understands markets as “institutions.”276
An “institution” is “a public system of rules which defines offices and
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the
like.”277  Rawls therefore sees markets as fundamentally constituted by
rules humans enact, not as social phenomena somehow existing inde-
pendently of, or prior to, human rulemaking.  As constituted by rules,
and not existing in some fashion “in and of themselves,” Rawls thus
rejects “market fundamentalism,” the tendency to view markets as act-
ing best when they are affected least by regulation.278  Of course there
can be good and bad regulatory regimes, but conceiving of markets as
institutions directly challenges the tendency to think of markets as in
271. Id. at 61.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 62.
274. Id. at 69.
275. Id. at 68.
276. “As examples of institutions, or more generally, social practices, we may think
of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of property.” Id. at 48.
See also Rawls’s discussion of markets, id. at 239–42.
277. Id. at 47.
278. See Awrey’s discussion of market fundamentalism, supra note 37, at 237
(describing “the widely held belief in the self-correcting nature of markets and their con-
sequent optimality as mechanisms for the allocation of society’s resources” and “the social
desirability of unfettered markets . . . .”).
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principle existing independently of law and its accompanying structures
of enforcement and regulation.
2. Political Principles
The foundational principles outlined so far provide the basis for
responding to the critics of the CCP mandate and other derivatives pro-
visions in Dodd-Frank.  Three other, more explicitly political concepts
buttress the Rawlsian defense of derivatives regulation: social stability,
income inequality, and the nature of public goods.
According to Rawls, stability is a key characteristic of a just social
system: “A just system must generate its own support.”279  Rawls is well
aware that individuals have many reasons not to obey laws and follow
norms that promote justice, and that if a substantial amount of individ-
uals decide not to act fairly but instead to act as “free riders” on the
system of social cooperation, a just social system cannot be main-
tained.280  Just systems ultimately depend on a public sense of justice,
where individuals are motivated on a psychological level to act out of
concern for others or from a basic sense of justice: “Meeting one’s
duties and obligations is now regarded by each person as a correct
answer to the actions of others.  His rational plan of life regulated by his
sense of justice leads to this conclusion.”281  As discussed below, wide-
spread public skepticism concerning the actions of leaders in the
finance industry appears to be deeply corrosive of the social fabric of
the United States, and movements such as Occupy Wall Street, and per-
haps less directly, the Tea Party, may be seen as reactions to the
excesses of the financial system that in turn threaten social stability.
Also relevant is income inequality.  In his discussion of “Back-
ground Institutions for Distributive Justice,” Rawls notes that conditions
of significant income inequality put into question the fair equality of
opportunity.282  Where fair equality of opportunity is lacking, “political
liberty likewise tends to lose its value, and representative government to
become such in name only.”283  Rawls believes that such income ine-
quality can be mitigated through progressive taxation, including a con-
sumption tax.  While the topic of income inequality and its possible
countermeasures is complex, the role of outsize compensation in the
financial industry in the United States is certainly a major cause of such
inequality.284
Finally, there is Rawls’s discussion of public goods.285  According
to Rawls, these are characterized by their indivisibility and publicness:
279. RAWLS, supra note 256, at 230.
280. See George Klosko, Rawls’s Argument from Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1882 (1994).  Klosko notes that moral stability is prior to political stability in A Theory of
Justice. Id. at 1886.
281. RAWLS, supra note 256, at 435.
282. Id. at 245–46.
283. Id. at 246.
284. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the
Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2010–2011).
285. RAWLS, supra note 256, at 235–39.
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while individuals may want more or less of them, public goods are con-
sumed to the same extent by the members of a society, and are freely
available to all to partake of.  And even though they are indivisible, pub-
lic goods do display variability in the degree of their indivisibility and
public-ness.  The provision of public goods is characterized by two well-
known problems: the free-rider problem is that while individuals may
desire such goods, they can shirk by taking advantage of them without
contributing to their provision.  A coercive agreement to provide these
goods, by levying taxes for example, is typically necessary to ensure their
existence.  Second, the provision of public goods involves externalities,
where their production causes “benefits and losses to others that may
not be taken into account by those who arrange for these goods or who
decide to produce them.”286  As a result, a discrepancy between their
private costs and benefits, on the hand, and their social costs and bene-
fits on the other, can arise, and government is required to insure that
enough public goods are in fact produced.  Public goods are also sub-
ject to externalities when private parties appropriate the benefits of
their use of a public good to themselves while leaving costs of the nega-
tive consequences of their behavior on the public at large through the
use, or abuse, of the good.  The famous “problem of the commons”
involves such a good, whereby villagers would exploit the common pas-
ture areas by keeping more cows there than the fields could sustain.287
The question for legislators and financial regulators is, to what extent
are financial markets public goods?288  To the extent they are, created
through government regulation and sustained through the tax reve-
nues that pay for regulators that police them, Rawls’s theory illuminates
an important aspect of their creation and maintenance.
B. Rawlsian Theory, the Financial System, and Derivatives Trading
1. Foundational Analysis
Central among the ideas reviewed above is the maximin solution:
social institutions are to be arranged to the benefit of the representative
individual from the least-advantaged class.  The other concepts—mar-
kets as institutions, social stability, income inequality, and public
goods—play a supporting role in the argument for CCP clearing, but
the maximin solution is its key.
Recall that the maximin solution is only applicable where knowl-
edge of possible outcomes is extremely uncertain, the person making
the decision is far more concerned with losing something important
than with any possible gain and the situation involves grave risks.289  All
three of these conditions obtain in a serious financial crisis such as that
of 2008.  Both during the crisis, when government officials were forced
286. Id. at 237.
287. See Hardin, supra note 223, at 179.
288. For an extensive treatment of this question, see Johnson, supra note 140; see
also Pirrong, supra note 194, at 12 (characterizing the collective capital of a CCP as a
commons).
289. See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
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to respond to fast-moving events in September and October 2008, and
afterwards, when legislators debated how to prevent such crises in the
future, action could only take place in conditions of fundamental
uncertainty.  The true nature and extent of the interconnection
between financial institutions, and indeed, the true map of causes of
the crisis itself, were to a large extent unknown.  Neither the complex
systems that legislators were tasked with regulating were (or are) wholly
understood, and so the consequences of various possible regulatory
interventions could not be wholly understood either.  Second, insofar
as legislators were acting in the interests of their constituents, they rec-
ognized that what was at stake in crafting financial legislation was to
forestall future disasters, where the interests of individuals were prima-
rily in avoiding loss, such as the loss of a job, home, or retirement sav-
ings, and not in realizing possible upside gains.  Third, financial crises
involve grave risks not only to a society’s economy, but by extension its
entire social fabric.  Witness the trauma that the long-term elevation of
the unemployment level has inflicted on workers of all age groups and
classes in the United States, and the even greater social dislocation
occurring in countries such as Greece and Spain as they confront the
European currency crisis.  The result of these reflections is that reduc-
tion of systemic risk should be the overriding goal of financial reform.
Even where such reduction carries with it efficiency costs, the societal
interest in avoiding severe financial crises justifies these costs.  Privileg-
ing the safety and stability of the financial system over possible upside
gains from improvements in efficiency follows directly from the applica-
tion of the maximin rule in the context of financial crises.
Even though the response to the financial crisis calls for applica-
tion of the maximin rule, this does not in itself justify the package of
reforms outlined above in Part II.  In order to embrace Title VII on
Rawlsian grounds, two further steps are required:
First, it is necessary to determine whether the specific reforms of
Title VII will, or are likely to, reduce systemic risk.  This inquiry necessa-
rily begins with the empirical.  There is, I believe, a strong argument
that Title VII will in fact accomplish this, but as we have seen in Part III,
expert opinion is divided, and the matter should be considered funda-
mentally uncertain.  Not only do experts disagree, but the success or
failure of the reforms is dependent on the future actions of regulators
and market participants.  Given this uncertainty, an argument either for
or against on purely empirical grounds is ultimately inconclusive—even
though there is a good argument for such regulation, it is not defini-
tive.  By extension, this means that there is no final answer to be had
within the utilitarian framework; the task of tallying costs and benefits
involves either far too much complexity and uncertainty if one tries to
make a relatively complete accounting of the various relevant costs and
benefits, or excludes important categories and makes questionable
assumptions if one tries to limit the scope of the relevant costs and
benefits.
The second step therefore involves stepping back from the empiri-
cal debate, and considering the best option given the information avail-
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able to us and our guiding political values.  The argument in favor of
the Dodd-Frank derivatives reforms is grounded in the combination of
the likelihood of the reduction in systemic risk resulting from the
reforms, assuming they are implemented effectively, on the one hand,
and the political goal of maintaining a healthy polity, with the financial
system playing an appropriate role in the economy at large, on the
other.  The holistic Rawlsian framework set forth in Part IV.A provides a
structure for grappling with complex and uncertain phenomena, as
well as giving a legitimate place to the important societal values that
provided the political fuel behind financial reform in 2009 and 2010.
The remainder of Part IV.B.1 takes the first additional step, and Part
IV.B.2 takes the second.
What argument then is there that a CCP is likely to reduce systemic
risk?  Building on the discussions above of the role of interconnection
in the financial crisis (Part I.B.4) and the specific mechanisms by which
a CCP is thought to reduce systemic risk (Part III.A.1), because deriva-
tives dealers were themselves functioning as “de facto unregulated”
CCPs290 at the same time that they conducted a host of other financial
activities, a comparison of CCPs with independent derivatives dealers
on four key axes indicates that a well-run CCP should be significantly
safer than a major bank acting as a derivative dealer in a bilateral mar-
ket.  CCPs differ greatly from derivatives dealers in terms of the nature
of their interconnection in the financial system, transparency, financial
isolation and corporate governance.
Interconnection.  Due to their array of financial activities, modern
investment banks are highly interconnected not only among a wide
array of parties, but in a wide array of markets: not only derivatives, but
investment banking, commercial banking, private wealth management,
asset management, etc.  These multifarious activities give rise to what
Professor Scott terms “asset interconnectedness,” the exposure of one
financial institution to another through direct credit exposures.291
Examples of creditors with asset interconnectedness to the major deriv-
atives dealers include derivatives counterparties, prime brokerage cli-
ents, investors in structured finance securities and investors in money
market funds holding the debt of such banks.292  Aside from asset inter-
connectedness, Scott also discusses “liability interconnectedness,” the
exposure of one institution to another on account of short-term fund-
ing needs.
The institution of a CCP clearing regime will have significant
effects on asset interconnectedness.  While Scott believes that neither
variety of interconnectedness was a significant cause of the financial cri-
sis, and that contagion instead was to blame, he does allow for the possi-
bility that fears on the part of Lehman’s counterparties due to asset
interconnectedness played a significant role in Lehman’s demise.293  A
290. Chander & Costa, supra note 4, at 677.
291. See SCOTT, supra note 96, at 2.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 4 (the government’s failure to rescue Lehman, “along with overall uncer-
tainty about the potential risks of asset interconnectedness, spurred a contagious liquidity
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CCP will remove asset interconnectedness on account of derivatives
activities from the financial system by interposing itself between
counterparties.294  While it is subject to risks of its own, primarily that it
becomes a dangerous node of risk in the system itself, and can give rise
to others as well,295 when performing its functions successfully, it will
remove a significant portion of total asset interconnectedness risk from
the system.  As for liability interconnectedness, Scott notes that a CCP
rearranges this risk in the system, and such effects will require further
study.
Transparency.  The interconnectedness and creditworthiness of a
major derivatives dealer was (and is) to a large degree unknown.296
Consequently, for their regulators and counterparties they are essen-
tially opaque institutions.  This qualitative factor surely heightened the
fears of the counterparties to Bear and Lehman, fears that prompted
them to refuse to engage in transactions with Bear and Lehman, and to
pull their collateral in the days before their respective failures.297
Unlike investment banks, which guard their proprietary informa-
tion closely, CCPs are fundamentally open.  As quasi-utilities, regulators
will have much greater access to information regarding CCPs in the
event of a crisis, and their relative simplicity and focus should make
action in the event of intervention easier than in the case of the sprawl-
ing financial behemoths that foundered in 2008.298  Under Title VII,
regulators will have access to all information concerning the CCP, and
aggregate information concerning trades will be publicly reported.
Unlike a dealer bank, therefore, CMs and regulators will not encounter
a CCP that is a “black box,” but rather one that is a regulated, transpar-
ent entity.
Financial isolation.  Although they are highly interconnected, the
independence of banks clearing in bilateral markets results in their
financial isolation, because they lack the ability to spread their losses
around.299  As independent entities, should they suffer losses in their
derivatives operations or elsewhere, they lack the ability to lessen the
pain by forcing their counterparties to bear some of these losses.  The
dangerousness of this situation may have contributed to the panic
behind the fall of Lehman and Bear, as parties in a variety of commer-
crisis in the short-term funding market.”); id. at 44 (“At the time [of Lehman’s collapse],
derivatives, particularly OTC contracts, fuelled significant concerns among market
observers who feared that positions to which Lehman was a counterparty or for which
Lehman was a reference entity could lead to substantial losses among major financial
institutions upon Lehman’s collapse.”).
294. Id. at 5–6 (“Central clearing of derivatives and other financial markets con-
tracts has the potential benefit of removing counterparty risk, which can stem market
concerns and uncertainty relating to asset interconnectedness”); id. at 100 (“central clear-
ing can completely insulate market participants from losses associated with the default of
a major dealer.”).
295. See generally Pirrong, supra note 175.
296. See Part I.B.4 supra. See also Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside
America’s Banks?, ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 60.
297. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 154 & 169 and accompanying text.
299. See Bliss & Papathanassiou, supra note 54, at 9.
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cial relationships with these entities pulled away from them upon the
mere spread of rumors of their stability.
A CCP, on the other hand, is not fundamentally isolated in this
way, as its very raison d’eˆtre is to function as a mutual insurance scheme
for its CMs.  In its role as insurer, it has the ability to call on its members
for support.  In addition, under Dodd-Frank Act Title VIII, “Payment,
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision,” the Federal Reserve Board
retains the authority to offer financial support to a CCP in limited
circumstances.300
Corporate Governance.  CCPs are now subject to corporate govern-
ance and risk management rules under Dodd-Frank that are specifically
tailored to their derivatives activities.301  Investment banks acting as
nodes in the derivatives markets were not subject to similar rules focus-
ing on their derivatives activities.  Again, for both CMs and regulators,
such rules should add a level of assurance for counterparties that man-
agement is focused on monitoring risk in inherently risky complex
derivatives activity.302
Given these four factors, there is a strong argument to be made
that a CCP will lessen the likelihood of serious disruption in the finan-
cial markets by serving to “cabin” or isolate shocks to the financial sys-
tem should a major derivatives dealer that is a CM fail, and more
fundamentally, to remove the element of contagion that spread, how-
ever irrationally, on the fears that asset interconnectedness could cause
counterparties to a bank such as Lehman to fail.303
Just as with other fundamental questions about the role of deriva-
tives in the financial system though, at least ex ante, this argument con-
tains a certain amount of uncertainty.  Perhaps most of all, the
uncertainty stems from the caveat that the success of the new regime is
fundamentally dependent on the performance of regulatory authorities
and the management of the various CCPs;304 the inherent complexity
of the factors involved in making a determination as to the benefits and
dangers of using CCPs for derivatives also contributes.  Since we cannot
come to a definitive, determinate answer to the question of whether a
300. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49,
91–92 (2011); see also Christian Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dollar Question: Can a
Central Bank Bailout a Central Counterparty Clearing House which is “Too Big to Fail”?, 6
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 433 (2012).
301. Dodd-Frank Act § 763; 15 U.S.C. 78q-1 (2012).  S.E.C. Release No. 34-680680,
Clearing Agency Standards, contains new rules applicable to clearing agencies governing
risk management and ongoing compliance under the Exchange Act.
302. On the topic of corporate governance of CCPs generally, see Sean J. Griffith,
Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61
EMORY L. J. 1153 (2012). See generally RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: THE
GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2011).
303. See supra notes 126, 173, and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 126, at 466 (concluding that the success of clearing-
houses depends on “better risk management and more resilience to losses . . . which are
ultimately in the control of federal regulators.”).
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CCP will be beneficial or not, a conclusive cost-benefit-type calculation
is unavailable.
In turn, this means that utilitarianism fails to offer a satisfactory
framework for deciding whether or not to support the Dodd-Frank
derivatives reform provisions.  Other factors in Rawls’s Theory of Justice
are relevant here, however, if one is willing to take an expansive view of
the financial system, placing the derivatives trading operations of the
major banks in the context of their entire operations, and then the role
of the major banks in the context of the economy and society at large.
The foundational principle of avoidance of systemic risk that follows
from application of the maximin principle in the context of a severe
financial crisis is supported by the likely economic and political implica-
tions of Title VII and the various political principles reviewed above in
Part IV.A.2.
2. Political Analysis
As reviewed above, Rawls notes that a just social system achieves
stability by generating its own support, avoids extreme income inequal-
ity, and provides for a certain amount of public goods.305  All these
characteristics of just societies are relevant to the debate over financial
regulation generally, and while the connection between derivatives
trading and these larger political concerns is admittedly indirect, the
social effects of an out-of-control financial system have fueled the push
for strong derivatives regulation.  Because the social effects reflect what
Rawls saw as indicators of an unjust system, his thought provides further
justification for financial reform on political grounds, supplementing
the qualified support that comes from the foundational argument
reviewed above.
While the fundamental stability of the American political system is
not currently in question, the widespread discontent over the financial
crisis and its deep effects on Americans are reflected in political move-
ments that could blossom into serious challenges to governmental legit-
imacy in the future.  The “tips of the iceberg” so to speak in the U.S. are
the twin movements of Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, both
grounded in phenomena including anger over the financial sector
bailouts, elevated unemployment in the wake of the financial crisis,
Congress’s dysfunction, and the seeming reluctance of the Obama
administration to prosecute financial executives for crimes related to
the crisis, among other causes.  The animus of the Tea Party is aimed
primarily at the perceived role and size of the U.S. federal government,
but the government bailouts of Wall Street are also targets of its anger,
and it displays a “Main Street” versus “Wall Street” sensibility that
decries the role of elites in the U.S. political system, including financial
and corporate executives.  Under the surface, the trends and forces that
generate corruption and income inequality call into question the stabil-
ity of our current economic and political system, as well as the status of
the financial markets as a public good.  From a Rawlsian perspective,
305. See supra notes 279–288 and accompanying text.
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 144 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 144 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 70  1-MAY-14 15:13
278 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
these crisis phenomena are evidence that the U.S. economic system is
not generating its own support.306
While the causal linkages between the specific features of the regu-
latory regime governing derivatives trading and these larger social and
political phenomena are indirect, and many details uncertain, by set-
ting forth the key facts about the financial industry and the role of
derivatives trading within it, it is possible to draw some lines of connec-
tion between sophisticated finance and the social phenomena at stake
in current political debates.  These lines of connection arise out of the
role derivatives trading plays in the overall profitability of the large
banks.  Keeping in mind the complexity of both the financial system
and larger social phenomena, as well as the necessary caveats to claims
of knowledge this complexity leads to—similar to the uncertainty that
plagued decision-makers in the Fall of 2008—what is the role of OTC
derivatives trading within the larger financial system, and what linkages
might there be between this activity and the larger societal effects the
financial system has?
The American economy has undergone a gradual “financializa-
tion” in recent decades.  Data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis shows that while in the past decade, financial profits
have ranged from highs of 40.19% in 2002 to a low of 27.6% in 2008,307
in the 1970s and 1980s they ranged from 15.08% in 1984 to 25.94% in
1989.308  Financial profits here are defined as the profits of finance,
insurance, bank, and other holding companies, so this is a broad cate-
gory,309 but it does illustrate the growing dominance of finance in the
American economy.  Regardless of whether this represents a natural
evolution of the American economy away from a manufacturing-based
economy towards a service-based economy, it does illustrate the domi-
nance of financial services within the economy.
Within the group of institutions making financial profits, the larg-
est banks have grown radically in size in recent years.  Their expansion
has occurred primarily through acquisitions, as smaller players in both
the commercial and investment banking sectors have been purchased
by larger institutions;310 the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 fos-
tered this trend, as it allowed institutions in different sectors to com-
306. It is important to note that for Rawls, “stability” as discussed in A THEORY OF
JUSTICE means primarily the stability of moral principles, not of a political system. See
Klosko, supra note 280, at 1883–84. That said, moral stability leads to political stability,
“which is a necessary condition for acceptable lives.” Id. at 1886.
307. Bureau of Economic Analysis data, available at http://www.econstats.com/
nipa/NIPA6_6_16D_.htm (Table 6.16D, Corporate Profits by Industry, Domestic Indus-
tries data.  Financial profits consist of finance, insurance, bank and other holding
companies).
308. Id. (Table 6.16B, Corporate Profits by Industry, Domestic Industries data).
309. See id. at Table 6.16D, n.1 (“Consists of finance and insurance and bank and
other holding companies”).  Because this category encompasses Berkshire Hathaway-type
holding companies, non-financial industry profits can be included in this category.
310. For an overview of the process of banking consolidation in recent decades, see
Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the “Long,
Strange Trip” About to End?, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 31 (2005).
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bine under one roof.  The banking behemoths Bank of America and
Citigroup were set in their present form through acquisitions of numer-
ous smaller banks and financial services institutions.  And in the wake of
the credit crisis, the number of American “bulge bracket” investment
banks has shrunk to just five, as JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear Stearns,
Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers went
out of existence.311
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, and
HSBC comprise the five major banks in the “dealers club” of derivatives
market-makers.  A member of the first four of these banks is currently
one or both counterparties to 93% of derivative contracts.312  Trading
revenue is approximately $30 billion a year for U.S. banks in total, con-
stituting a major source of their total profits.313  Excluding Goldman
Sachs, trading revenue for the largest four banks varies from loss posi-
tions to 16% of their profits over the past three years; for Goldman,
trading revenue is typically much higher, amounting to 50–70% of reve-
nue.314  (This has the effect of making Goldman a “giant hedge fund
with a small investment bank attached.”315)  While such numbers are
diminishing as Dodd-Frank takes effect, they do illustrate how trading
has displaced the traditional investment banking activities of underwrit-
ing and advisory services during the past decade.  The main engine of
this growth has been the increase in derivatives trading operations.
At the same time that financial industry profits have comprised a
greater share of the total domestic economy, and trading revenues have
grown within the largest institutions themselves, pay within the financial
industry has grown much faster than pay in other sectors of the econ-
omy.  New York State statistics on Wall Street pay indicate that whereas
in the early 1980s pay on Wall Street was just twice that of other wages
in New York City, in the past decade it reached multiples of five times as
much.316  In 2007, it reached a high of over $400,000, versus approxi-
mately $65,000 for other industries.317
311. Present American “bulge bracket” banks are Bank of America/Merrill Lynch,
JPMorgan, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.
312. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FIRST QUARTER 2012, at 9 (“The four banks
with the most derivatives activity hold 93 percent of all derivatives, while the largest 25
banks account for nearly 100% of all contracts.”).
313. See id. (Graph 6A, Quarterly Trading Revenues Cash & Derivatives Positions).
314. See id. (Graph 6B, Quarterly Trading Revenue as a Percentage of Gross Reve-
nue Cash & Derivative Positions).
315. Stephen Foley, Goldman Sachs Forced to Withdraw Hedge Fund, THE INDEPENDENT
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/goldman-sachs-
forced-to-withdraw-hedge-fund-2355644.html.
316. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI & KENNETH B. BLEIWAS, STATE OF NEW YORK COMP-
TROLLER, THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK, REPORT 12-2012, available at http://www.
osc.state.ny.us/osdc/rpt12-2012.pdf.
317. See id. (Figure 5, Average Salaries in New York City).
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The dominance of finance and its outsized pay scale relative to
other occupations is a main driver of income inequality in America.318
According to Rawls, extremes of income are only justified where they
will bring about benefits for the lowest representative person in a given
society.  In the wake of the financial crisis and ensuing “Great Reces-
sion” it now appears doubtful that such high pay packages for financial
industry bosses and workers in fact benefit society as a whole; instead,
they likely incentivized reckless risk-taking that rewards short-term trad-
ing profits at the expense not only of the institutions employing these
individuals, but of society as a whole.  Approximately $7 trillion of hous-
ing equity has disappeared with the collapse of the housing bubble,319
and unemployment rose to 8.1% or above from February 2009 to
August 2012.320  Fueling the housing bubble was a boom in predatory
lending on the part of the mortgage brokers, many of whom were
owned or acquired by the major financial institutions.321  Of the
approximately 130 million private dwelling units in the United
States,322 about 75 million have some form of mortgage debt; of these,
at least 11 million are underwater, and to date there have been approxi-
mately 7 million foreclosures, with another 8 to 10 million homes cur-
rently at risk.  In sum, it is difficult to argue that compensation in the
financial industry in fact incentivized activities benefitting society as a
whole, which would be chosen by the “representative man” from the
lower classes in Rawls’s Original Position.  On the contrary, some prom-
inent economists are now exploring the idea that the deregulated
financial system of the past decade in fact amounted to a wasteful, rent-
seeking enterprise.323
318. See Stephen N. Kaplan & Joshua D. Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Con-
tributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (Ctr. Research Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 615,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931280.
319. See William C. Dudley, Housing and the Economic Recovery, remarks at the New
Jersey Bankers Association Economic Forum, Iselin, New Jersey, Jan. 6, 2012; see also
RAJASHRI CHAKRABARTI ET AL., HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND SAVING DURING THE 2007 RECESSION,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 482 (2011).
320. See Databases, Tables, & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000. Note also that the broader U-6 unemploy-
ment gauge was at 15.1% or higher from February 2009 to January 2012; the U-6 measure
counts “Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part
time for economic reasons, as a percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally
attached workers.” Id.
321. See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185 (2007); Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2006–2007).
322. The U.S. Census Bureau lists 131,704,730 housing units. See State & County
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states /00000.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2014).
323. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012); Robert J. Shiller, The
Best, Brightest, and Least Productive?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sep. 20, 2013), http://www.pro-
ject-syndicate.org/commentary/the-rent-seeking-problem-in-contemporary-finance-by-
robert-j—shiller (exploring the idea that too many top university graduates choose
careers in branches of finance such as trading and investment banking “whose activities
may be economically and socially useless, if not harmful.”).
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In addition to the effects of income inequality, systemic risk, and
the political instability that result from these factors is the problem of
regulatory capture of the governmental authorities responsible for over-
sight of the financial industry.  In Rawlsian terms, the inability or unwill-
ingness of governing officials to regulate a particular sector of the
economy or “institution” amounts to political corruption.  Rawls
observes that in situations of income inequality, wealthy individuals
have both the means and the incentive to corrupt the governing pro-
cess, turning democracy into an empty shell.324  Numerous commenta-
tors have explored the role of regulatory capture in the context of the
financial crisis.325  Not only are federal agencies such as the SEC
underfunded and understaffed, regulators are subject to the implicit
temptation of the “revolving door” of employment in the industries
they formerly regulated upon leaving government service.
The main way the new regulations will work to ameliorate these
negative political phenomena Rawls describes is through a reduction in
the profitability and then the size of the major banks that also happen
to be derivative dealers.  This is therefore a roundabout way to achieve
a reduction in their status as “Too Big to Fail,” and also their economic
and political influence.326  Should the new regime reduce the size of
the largest banks, in addition to reducing the overall systemic risk they
present to the economy, this may also further the political goals of
reducing income inequality, restoring public esteem for the financial
sector, and fostering the health of the financial markets at large,
thereby promoting a valuable public good.  These goals are rather
abstract, but they are legitimate political desiderata of the financial
reform legislation from a holistic, Rawlsian perspective.  That a well-
managed CCP regime is likely to reduce the likelihood of the failure of
its systemically important clearing members, preventing a repeat of
2008, is the key to the argument in favor of Dodd-Frank Title VII; that it
may also advance these political goals offers further support.
C. Regulatory Danger Zones
Even though the CCP regime will likely be beneficial, this does not
mean that it does not carry with it various risks arising from both the
nature of the global financial system and the CCP mechanism itself.
324. RAWLS, supra note 256, at 246; see also C.M.A. McCauliff, Didn’t Your Mother
Teach You to Share?  Wealth, Lobbying and Distributive Justice in the Wake of the Economic Crisis,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 (2010).
325. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripart-
ism in Financial Regulation, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 621, 629–32 (2012); Adam J. Levitin,
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. REG. 143, 159–61
(2009); Erik Gerding, Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial Institu-
tions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States, 15 NEXUS J. OP. 135,
151–60 (2009).
326. See Roe, supra note 62, at 40–41 (observing that the building of “largely cen-
tralized clearinghouses in the hope (but not the certainty) that the industry will decon-
centrate seems a peculiar policy in its indirectness, although perhaps regulators have
concluded that they cannot otherwise induce market restructuring and
deconcentration.”).
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Some of the criticisms reviewed in Part III.B.1 above still retain their
force, and others need to be taken into account as well.  While a Rawl-
sian public policy will embrace this regulatory schema, it admittedly
places a heavy burden on financial regulators to properly implement
this law.
Regulators implementing and overseeing a CCP-based regulatory
structure will have to monitor four principle areas of danger: 1) the risk
inherent in the CCP itself; 2) the trade-off between systemic risk and
efficiency of netting as the number of CCPs decreases; 3) the unin-
tended consequences of the collateral requirements; and 4) the threat
to the competitiveness of the American financial system (and through
the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR,” to Europe’s
as well) that strong derivatives regulation represents.  All four issues are
serious concerns, and the choice to adopt Title VII, instead of pursuing
an alternative path, such as Gubler’s or Johnson’s proposals, or doing
nothing, forces regulators to confront these concerns.
1. Creation of a “Too Interconnected to Fail” Entity
To begin, the overarching risk of the CCP mandate is that a CCP
itself will become “too big to fail,” or more accurately, “too intercon-
nected to fail.”  A highly negative outcome for Title VII would be that
the mandate simply replaces individual dealer banks with CCPs as cen-
ters of risk in the financial system.327  In order to forestall this, regula-
tors need to lay out clear requirements for the CCP itself to insure that
it does not itself become so risky that it is prone to catastrophic failure.
Fortunately, market participants are already approaching this issue and
grappling with possible solutions to prevent the implosion of a CCP.  As
discussed above, this is perhaps the central concern with the Dodd-
Frank clearing mandate.  If the likelihood of a catastrophic failure is
minimal, the effect of the mandate will be to cabin the risk of default of
any one member firm.  If CCP failure is a significant possibility, on the
other hand, we are likely in no better a position than in September
2008, and possibly in a much worse one.  While market participants
have strong incentives to push for strong CCPs,328 in the regulator-cen-
tric model of regulation argued for here, ultimately governmental
authorities bear the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the financial
system.
2. The Trade-Off Between Systemic Risk Reduction and Netting
Efficiency
The second area of focus should be efficiency of netting.  As Duffie
& Zhu demonstrate, there is an inherent trade-off between efficient
multilateral netting and the size of a CCP.329  Therefore, what is most
327. See Roe, supra note 62, at 1691–92.
328. See Matt Cameron, Blow Your Clearing House Down, RISK MAG., Oct. 3, 2011, at
16.
329. See Duffie & Zhu, supra note 50; see also supra notes 201–07 and accompanying
text.
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beneficial in terms of systemic risk reduction on the level of counterpar-
ties, by reducing the amount of derivatives obligations outstanding, is in
tension with the first point reviewed above: creation of a “too intercon-
nected to fail” entity.  A massive CCP facilitates multilateral clearing,
clearing which only occurs among individually commensurate deriva-
tives, not across product category, as in the case of bilateral clearing.
But the fewer the amount of CCPs, the greater the disaster should one
fail.  Regulators will have to focus on this threat, including searching for
solutions to the problem such as TriOptima’s clearing system.
3. Unintended Consequences of Collateral Requirements
Third, the collateral requirements instituted by Dodd-Frank have
the potential to create significant new linkages in the financial system,
thereby ushering in through the backdoor the unknown and unpoliced
interconnections the mandate attempts to reduce in the first place.
Once again, Craig Pirrong has drawn attention to this risk.330  This
highlights the difficulty of mandating structures to curb risky activities
in the face of profitable opportunities for market participants to engage
in them.  While further regulation of collateral provision services may
ultimately be necessary, it comes at the expense of introducing a fur-
ther layer of complexity to the system, which only arises because of the
first-order regulation to begin with.
4. Threats to Competitiveness
Finally, financial regulators need to push for international harmo-
nization of the regulation of OTC derivatives in order to create a level
playing field for American, European, and other financial institutions
and effective regulation of risky financial products.331  While it is possi-
ble that the United States and the E.U. may arrive at harmonization on
this point, as EMIR332 calls for CCP clearing, at this point it is too soon
to tell how the final regulatory landscape concerning OTC derivatives
will look in Europe.333  Japan now requires CCP clearing for certain
categories of derivatives as well.334  In order to preserve equality of
opportunity among financial institutions, and prevent risk from migrat-
ing to other corners of the financial system, uniform regulation is desir-
330. See Pirrong, supra note 216, at 67–73.
331. See generally Baker, supra note 221; see also Edward F. Greene & Joshua L.
Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1083, 1120–29 (2012).
332. European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND
MARKETS AUTHORITY (ESMA), http://ec.europa.eu/internal/_market/securities/isd/
mifid_en.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
333. See Georges Ugeux, Can Europe Produce a Coherent and Effective Financial Regula-
tion?, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 20, 31–32 (2012).
334. See Leng-Fong Lai et al., Development in CCP in Japan – Interest Rate Swap Clear-
ing, CLIFFORD CHANCE (April 27 2012), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2012/
04/development_of_ccpinjapaninterestrateswa0.html; see also Keith Noyes, How Asia is
Progressing Towards OTC Clearing Deadline, RISK.NET (June 25, 2012), http://www.risk.net/
asia-risk/opinion/2184559/asia-progressing-otc-clearing-deadline.
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able.335  Given that the financial system is largely globalized, the
international effects of regulation, and regulatory gaps, cannot be
ignored.
Monitoring these areas will take diligence and resources on the
part of regulators, a diligence and ability that was often lacking in the
run-up to the financial crisis and beyond.  This Article argues that due
to misplaced incentives, it is too optimistic to believe that financial insti-
tutions will effectively combat the problem of systemic risk on their
own, and that more direct oversight is preferable to a SRO-type regula-
tory structure.  This is not to say however that individual institutions will
not have much to contribute to this effort, and there are promising
signs that many of them are aware of the risks derivatives transactions
can pose and are attempting to mitigate them proactively.  It does how-
ever argue that ultimately, a strong and agile governmental regulator is
necessary as a policeman in financial markets with the final responsibil-
ity for policing market actors and monitoring the markets.  This view is
commensurate with the position that financial markets pose unique
risks to economies, and that unchecked financial markets sooner or
later crash.
CONCLUSION
Despite the prospective burdens that Dodd-Frank places on regula-
tors and market participants, Title VII is a proper response to the
uncertainty inherent in complex financial markets.  Because of the
extreme complexity of financial instruments and institutional arrange-
ments among market participants, a clear cost-benefit analysis is
unavailable to help us determine whether or not the new regulations
should be beneficial.  And even if one were available, the standard cost-
benefit analyses of economic policy carry with them assumptions that
the events of recent years have called into question.  This Article there-
fore comes to two main conclusions.
First, because a cost-benefit analysis does not provide a clear result,
the utilitarian perspective of conventional economic analysis alone can-
not ultimately be relied on to determine whether the Dodd-Frank deriv-
atives reforms are desirable or not.  While a cost-benefit analysis is
obviously a crucial input to the decision-making process of public pol-
icy, here its results are indeterminate.  Moreover, a standard cost-bene-
fit analysis fails to take into account important societal and political
considerations that necessarily influence legislative and regulatory
processes.  By contrast, under a Rawlsian framework the Dodd-Frank
derivatives reforms make good sense.  Beginning with the position that
financial crises ought to be viewed as societally traumatic events in
which the maximin rule applies, the safety of the financial system
335. For an interesting counter-argument, see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12, at
10 (“A country’s public policy should not be concerned about the success of its banks or
other firms as such, because success that is achieved by taxpayer subsidies or exposing the
public to excessive risks—for example, the risks of pollution or of a financial crisis—is not
beneficial to the economy and to society.”).
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should be given priority over other values, particularly its potential effi-
ciency.  There is a solid argument that CCP clearing and the other new
regulations will in fact reduce systemic risk in the financial system,
though this is ultimately uncertain and dependent on future actions of
regulators and market participants.  Even given this uncertainty, a Rawl-
sian understanding of markets and their larger role in society shows
that the political benefits of a reduction in the profitability and there-
fore size of the largest banks may be substantial.
Second, the analysis in this Article highlights the shortcomings of
traditional financial economics and economic policy in coming to
terms with complicated events that contain a large measure of “Knight-
ian uncertainty.”  Taking Pirrong’s analysis of CCP clearing as represen-
tative, it ignores the likely spillover of contagion effects through
channels of interconnection created by derivatives trading between
financial institutions, assumes that what is beneficial for the efficiency
of the derivatives trading system itself is beneficial to society at large,
and attempts to achieve precision by limiting itself to a relatively narrow
set of factors in carrying out its cost-benefit analysis.  An important
effect of the global financial crisis has been to call into question the
intellectual framework used to understand financial markets and their
role in the larger economy and society in general in recent decades.336
This Article is intended to be a contribution to this process and an
advocacy of policy positions which draw on thought outside of the utili-
tarian tradition.
336. See, e.g., D. Colander et al., The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic
Economics, (U. Copenhagen Dept. Econ. Discussion Paper NO. 09-03, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1355882; GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND
WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); see also Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the
Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 151 (2012).
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